U.S. Foreign Policy Interests and Iran’s Nuclear Program by Behrang, Fahimeh
  
 
 
 
 
U.S. Foreign Policy Interests and Iran’s Nuclear Program 
   
A Thesis Submitted to the College of Graduate Studies and Research 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts 
 
In the Department of Political Studies 
 
University of Saskatchewan 
 
Saskatoon 
   
By 
Fahimeh Behrang 
 
© Copyright Fahimeh Behrang, October 2012. All rights reserved.
i 
 
PERMISSION TO USE 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate degree from 
the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make it freely 
available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis in any manner, 
in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who 
supervised my thesis work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department of Political 
Studies or the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any 
copying or publication or use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed 
without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me 
and to the University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material 
in my thesis. 
Requests for permission to copy or to make other uses of materials in this thesis in whole or part 
should be addressed to: 
 Head of the Department of Political Studies 
 University of Saskatchewan 
 Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A5 
 Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 This thesis is an analysis of the motivations behind U.S. efforts to stop Iran from 
developing a nuclear weapons program. It argues that U.S. actions must be viewed within a 
larger context; specifically it must be viewed from the perspective of the overall interests of the 
U.S. in the Middle East. These interests include ensuring access to Middle Eastern oil, protecting 
the state of Israel and eliminating security threats, to the U.S. and its allies, especially from 
terrorist organizations.   
The thesis examines U.S.-Iran’s relationship over the nuclear issues a historical context, 
beginning with Eisenhower Administration. It is guided by the insights derived from the realist 
paradigm in International Relations theory which stresses national interest, defined in terms of 
power as the major determinant in state behaviour.  The study shows that the U.S. was quite 
supportive of Iran developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only when relations between 
the two states were cordial.  However, since the Islamic Revolution of the late 1970s, the 
relationship has been marked by hostility on both sides, and importantly, by American attempts 
to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, particularly its goal of developing a nuclear weapons 
program,  and the latter’s efforts to circumvent these.  An Iran in possession of nuclear weapons 
is seen as a dangerous threat to Middle Eastern stability and, of course, to U.S. interests in the 
region. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Iran’s nuclear program, specifically its nuclear weapons program,   has been at the centre 
of controversy in international relations since 2003, when Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuge 
program was disclosed. Led by the United States (U.S.) many countries and international 
organizations including Israel, the European Union (EU), the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), have sought to either 
contain, or completely halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions.  
 This hostility between the U.S. and Iran is a phenomenon that began with the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979 and the virulent anti-Americanism that has prevailed in the country since, 
especially in the upper echelons of power.  Prior, the two countries were firm allies and the U.S. 
was the leading supporter of Iran’s nuclear energy program. However, with the ascent of the 
ayatollahs to power, their hostile stance towards the U.S. and concerns that the country was 
building nuclear weapons technology, the U.S. and its allies have been taking steps to punish the 
regime and isolate it internationally.  An Iran in possession of nuclear weapons represents a 
direct threat to the Middle East and to U.S. interests in the region.   Tehran, of course, denies 
pursuing a weapons program and claims that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.
1
  If 
this were so, or if the U.S. were convinced it were so, there is historical evidence to show that the 
US would not be imposing sanctions.  Given this, the US must be confident that the 
administration is pursuing a nuclear weapons program and that is the problem as it threatens US 
interests in the region. 
 This is the context that sets the stage for this study.  The thesis argues that until the 
Islamic Revolution and the rise of virulent American hostility in the country, the U.S. was a 
strong supporter of Iran’s nuclear energy program, supplying it with funds, technology and 
know-how in this field.  However, with the ascent of the ayatollahs to power , their rampant anti-
Americanism , and the country’s  pursuit of a nuclear weapons program,  the relationship 
                                                          
1
   Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran,  “Basic Facts About Iran’s Peaceful  Nuclear Activities,” 
(Statement on the website of the  Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Oslo).  http://iranembassy.no/en/6.htm  
Accessed July 28, 2012 
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dramatically altered, and not surprisingly, the US has been responding accordingly, taking steps 
to  punish and isolate the regime, and to destroy its nuclear program. An Iran with nuclear 
weapons represents a dangerous and immediate threat to US interests in the region.  These 
interests are understood as: ensuring access to Middle Eastern oil, protecting Israel and 
eliminating security threats, especially from terrorist organizations.  In demonstrating its claims, 
the research will analyze the effects of Iran’s nuclear program on U.S. national interests in these 
different spheres and show how the policies adopted by the U.S., such as the imposition of 
economic sanctions and U.N resolutions on Iran, are all geared to undermining Iran’s nuclear 
weapons agenda.    
1.1 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework which guides this analysis is that of realism.  Though 
challenged by many, it is this author’s contention that realism still has relevance as an 
explanatory tool in contemporary international relations, and specifically when it comes to  
explaining U.S. actions vis a vis Iran with respect to the nuclear question.  While some scholars 
such as Julian Dawson
2
 and Sean Paul Ashley
3
 find that constructivism, a more recent school of 
thought offers, greater insights into explaining aspects of Iran-U.S. relations, it is the contention 
of this thesis that while there are merits to the constructivist paradigm, when it comes to the 
nuclear issue, realism is the more fruitful of the two in terms of its explanatory powers.    
1.2 Constructivism 
Constructivism emphasizes values, culture and social identities including nationalism, 
ethnicity, race, gender, religion, and sexuality as the central forces shaping global politics.
4
 
Constructivist argues that different groups recognize their identities as  interest and base their actions 
on defence or promotion of  these identities. Though power is considered a relevant element in 
                                                          
2
 Julian Dawason, “ A Constructivist Approach to the US-Iranian Nuclear Problem,” (M.A. Thesis, University of 
Calgary, 2011). http://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/48728/1/2011_Dawson_MSS.pdf (Accessed September 05, 
2012). 
3 Sean P. Ashley,  “The Iranian Nuclear Program: Realist vs. Constructivist Models,” E - International Relations, 
(August 18, 2012)  
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/18/the-iranian-nuclear-program-realist-vs-constructivist-models/ (Accessed September 
05, 2012). 
4
 Ashley, “The Iranian Nuclear Program.”  
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international politics, constructivism places more emphasis on how ideas and identities are created, how 
they evolve, and how they shape the way states understand and respond to situations.
5
   
Emanuel Adler describe constructivism “the manner in which the material world shapes and is 
shaped by human action and interaction.”6 He believes that constructivism could be a middle 
ground between the widely separated positivism/materialist and idealist/interpretive philosophy 
of social science.
7
 Another author, Stefano Guzzini, has argued that “constructivism is 
epistemologically about the social construction of knowledge, and ontologically about the 
construction of social reality.”8 
In the Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Ian Hurd has underlined four main 
features which differentiate constructivism from other perspectives in International Relations.
9
 
First, constructivism believes in “social construction”. He argues that by social construction, the 
acts and existence of states are based on the meaning and values that constitute them. His 
argument is contrary to realism which recognizes “materialism” as the main embodiment of 
international politics. Indeed, realist believe that material subjects like strategic resources, 
weapons and people constitute power and have direct effects on international patterns and 
behaviors. 
The second feature Hurd has identified about constructivism is that “national interest” 
formation is based on social factors like identity, socialization and environment.
 10 
According to 
him, “[p]eople act toward the objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that 
the objects have for them.”11  Realism, however, considers material interest including survival, 
                                                          
5
 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: one world, many theories,” Foreign Policy, No. 110 (Spring, 1998), 41. 
http://ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/pol160A/Walt.1998.pdf  (Accessed September 05, 2012). 
6
 Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in world politics.” European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 3, (1997): 322. 
http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/3/3/319.full.pdf+html (Accessed September 19, 2012).  
7
 Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground, 323 
8
 Stefano Guzinni, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations.” European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 6, (2000): 174. 
http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~courses/PoliticalScience/661B1/documents/GuzziniReconstructionofConstructivisminI
R.pdf (Accessed September 19, 2012). 
9
 Hurd, “Constructivism,” 300-302. 
10
 Ian Hurd, “Constructivism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan 
Snidal, (Oxford: Oxfor University Press: 2008), 300-302. 
http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~ihu355/Home_files/17-Smit-Snidal-c17.pdf  (Accessed September 19, 2012). 
11
 Jutta Weldes, “Constructing national interest,” European journal of international relations, Vol. 2, (1996): 279 
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power and security as the main motivations of states in regards to “national interest”.12  The third 
feature of constructivism that Hurd identified is “mutual constitution of structures and agents”. 13 
By this, Hurd means action of states are important factors in shaping the norms of international 
relations, and these institutions and norms contribute to characterizing, socializing, and 
influencing states.
14
  Finally, Hurd argues that constructivists use terms like “rivalry” to describe 
the international system, while realist consider “anarchy” as the main motivation or context of 
international relations behaviour.
 15
 
International Relation scholars such as Masoud Mousavi Shafaee look at Iran’s foreign 
policy behaviour toward the West from a constructivist perspective. In the article, “A 
constructive view into the enmity between Iran and the west: Manifestation of the Islamic 
Revolution Identity in Iranian Foreign Policy Behavior,” Shafaee argues that a state’s identity, 
rationality and behaviour have been created through a system of meaning and in relation with 
others, and this he believes provides a good theoretical basis for understanding the foreign policy 
of states such as Iran.
16
 This article focuses on the role of domestic/ideational structures in the 
construction of Iran's identity and its foreign policy behavior toward the west.
17
  He concluded 
that it is true that the identity of Iran and its inimical behavior towards the West have been 
constructed through both material and meaning structures, but he believes that based on the 
approach of one of the leading constructivist scholars, Alexander Wendt, ideational structures, 
not the material ones, have a constitutive role in constructing identities.
18
 
1.3 Realism 
Realism has a cynical view of human nature and realists believe that people are naturally 
egoistic and are motivated by the drive to increase their power in order to secure their self 
interest. In the case of global politics, realists believe that the central actors are states and their 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/Pol272/Weldes.pdf  (Accessed September 19, 2012). 
12
 Hurd, constructivism, 300-302. 
13
 Weldes, “Constructing national interest,” 303. 
14
 Jutta Weldes, “Constructing national interest,”304. 
15
 Weldes, “Constructing national interest,”304. 
16
 Msoud Mousavi Shafaee, “A constructive view into the enmity between Iran and the west: Manifestation of the 
Islamic Revolution Identity in Iranian foreign policy behavior,” Geopolitics Quarterly, Volume: 6, No 4, (2010): 
201, http://www.sid.ir/en/VEWSSID/J_pdf/108020112011.pdf (Accessed September 19, 2012). 
17
 Shafaee, “A constructive view into the enmity,” 202. 
18
 Shafaee, “A constructive view into the enmity,” 202. 
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principal mission is national interests.
 19
 Conflict, according to realist, is a dominant factor in 
international political relations, as each state seeks to maximize its self-interest in an 
environment of anarchy.  In such a situation the survival of a state is based on its military power, 
and the most important issue-area in the field is the threat or actual use of force. When it comes 
to foreign policy and security, realists believe states must make decision based on their own 
interest. According to Hans Morgenthau, one of leading scholars in realist approach, 
“International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.”20 And the lack of supernational 
power turns international system to anarchy.
21
  
Morgenthau has described six main principles that define realism. These are “(a) Politics 
is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature; (b) the concept of interest is 
defined in terms of power; (c) power and interest are variable in content; (d) universal moral 
principles cannot be applied to the actions of states; (e) political realism refuses to identify the 
moral aspirations of a particular nation with laws that govern the universe and, (f) the autonomy 
of the political sphere is important in decision making”. 22 
According to John Mearsheimer, there are five core assumptions underlying 
Morgenthau’s principles that explain states competition for power in international system.23 
First, Mearsheimer argues that great powers are the main actor of international politics and 
anarchy prevails in the system; there is no ‘government of governments’ to implement rules and 
punishment. Second, the relationship between states is built on unreliability as states cannot be 
certain about the intentions of other states. Moreover, the international system is unpredictable 
since states intentions can quickly change toward each other. Therefore, states focus on the 
balance of power as a means of security against each other rather than rely on stated intentions. 
Third, Mearsheimer argues that the main motivation of states is survival. In other words, states 
                                                          
19
 Allen Sens and Peter Stoett, Global Politic: Origins, Currents, Directions, (Ontario: Nelson College Indigenous 
4th edition, 2002), 11-12. 
20
 Hans Morgenthau cited in Ken Booth, “Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice,” 
International Affairs, Vol. 67, No.3 (Jul., 1991): 528. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2621950.pdf?acceptTC=true  (Accessed September 19, 2012). 
21
 Sens and Stoett, Global Politic: Origins, 11-12. 
22
 Hans Morgenthau cited in Jack Donnelly, Realism and international relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000): 7. 
23
 Peter Toft’s paraphrase Mearsheimer, “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power.” 
Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol.8, No.4 (2005): 383.   
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jird/journal/v8/n4/pdf/1800065a.pdf (Accessed September 19, 2012).                                                                     
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seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. 
Fourth, states act rationally and adopt strategies that maximize their survival. Finally, 
Mearsheimer argues that all states possess some military bases that make them capable to impose 
pressure or harm other states.
24
 
Accordingly, Mearsheimer argues that, “in this situation states soon realize that the most 
efficient way to guarantee survival in anarchy is to maximize their relative power with the 
ultimate aim of becoming the strongest power that is, hegemony”.25 However, he posits that “not 
all states can maximize their relative power simultaneously and, therefore; the state system is 
destined to be an arena of relentless security competition as long as it remains anarchic.”26 
It is following these lines of arguments that this thesis contends that realism offers the 
best explanatory power on U.S. – Iran relations on the nuclear issue.  Each nation is operating in 
an environment of anarchy and insecurity.  Each feels threatened by the other, and each is taking 
the action necessary to defend itself.   
This thesis argues that Iran’s nuclear program is a threat to U.S. national interest 
including security, access to oil and the security of Israel that is why the U.S. is committed to 
preventing Iran from developing its nuclear weapons program. This thesis addresses the issue 
from a long term historical perspective and within realist framework. It relies on authors who 
have studied Iran’s nuclear threat to the U.S. national interest from this perspective. Nihat Ali 
Ozcan and Ozgur Ozdamar, for example,  in their article, “Iran’s nuclear program and the future 
of U.S. – Iranian relations” have looked at Iran’s nuclear program and the threat it poses to the 
U.S. interest in the Middle East from a realist perspective.  Hence they see the U.S.’ response as 
being based on securing its access to  oil and gas supplies, eliminating threats from terrorist 
organizations, preventing the spread of WMDs, and maintaining Israel’s existence as well as its 
qualitative military advantage.
27
 They argue that Iran’s nuclear weapons program would be a 
direct threat to these interests.  Having nuclear weapons would provide Iran with the capability to 
secure the Islamic regime’s survival, threaten Israel, and fuel a nuclear arms race in the Middle-
                                                          
24
 Peter Toft’s paraphrase Mearsheimer, “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist,” 383. 
25
 Peter Toft’s paraphrasing of Mearsheimer, “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist,” 383. 
26
 Peter Toft’s paraphrasing of Mearsheimer, “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist,” 383. 
27
 Nihat A. Ozcan and  Ozgur Ozdamar, “Iran’s Nuclear Program And The Future Of U.S.- Iranian Relations.” 
Middle East Policy, XVI, No. 1 (2009): 125.  
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East; it also carries the threat that such weapons can be transferred to terrorist groups. 
Consequently, Iran’s influence would increase and affect on the balance of power in the region in 
such a way that U.S power would be threatened. 
Ozcan and Ozdamar have identified two primary interests for Iran in its development of a 
nuclear weapons program:  protection of its territorial integrity and ensuring the survival of its 
regime and its desire to become the leading power in the region.
28
 They also described different 
scenarios or options that the U.S. might adopt in dealing with a nuclear Iran.  These are: 
diplomacy, economic sanctions, international pressures, psychological warfare and finally, military 
force. The authors believe that Iran would use its nuclear weapons program to gain leverage 
against the U.S. on matters  that threaten its survival, and that the  U.S. would consider the use of 
force as an option to confront Iran’s nuclear program. 29 
Another scholar who uses the realist paradigm to analyze U.S.-Iran relations is Peter 
Pham.
30
  In his article “Iran’s threat to the Strait of Hormuz: A Realist Assessment,” Pham uses a 
realist argument to explain the importance of the Strait of Hormuz to the interests of not only the 
countries in the Middle-East, but also to the world. He described the possible threat of Iran to the 
Strait of Hormuz and analyzes various tactics Iran could use to close the Strait (including, 
amongst others, the use of naval forces, antiship cruise missiles, moored and drifting contact 
mines, amongst others). However, he suggests that since the Strait of Hormuz is a corridor of 
vital importance for Iran also, especially in regards to gasoline imports, the country needs to 
keep the strait open based on its dependency on carbohydrates products. 
Still other scholars, such as John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, have used the 
realist paradigm to evaluate U.S. interests with respect to the protection of Israel.
31
 According to 
Carl Brown’s assessment, “Mearsheimer and Walt use realist national-interest analysis to deftly 
deconstruct the usual justifications for supporting Israel – that Israel is a fellow democracy, a 
                                                          
28
 Ozcan and Ozdamar, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 125. 
29
 Ozcan and  Ozdamar, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 
30
 Peter Pham. “Iran’s Threat To The Strait Of Hormuz: A Realist Assessment,” American Foreign Policy Interests,  
32, (2010). 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10803921003697542 (September 29, 2012). 
31
 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby, 2007. 
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strategic asset, or a tiny state in danger of being overwhelmed by its neighbors.”32  The authors 
argue that the Israel Lobby is responsible for America’s unbalanced policy in the Middle East, 
and that this pro-Israeli policy is against the U.S. national interests in the region. The authors 
suggest that in order to promote its national interest in the Middle East, the U.S. should adopt a 
more balanced foreign policy, one not influenced by the Israel Lobby. They also believe that 
U.S. foreign policy is not influenced by the fact that Israel is a strategic ally or that supporting 
Israel is a moral consideration, rather the only reason behind the US support for Israel is the 
Israel Lobby.
33
  
In sum realism is an explanatory tool in contemporary international relations, and 
specifically when it comes to explaining U.S. actions vis a vis Iran with respect to the nuclear 
question. It is this perspective which informs the analysis here. 
1.4 Methodology 
 To assess the effects of Iran’s nuclear program on U.S. interests in the Middle East, the 
research relies on qualitative analysis. Primary resources, such as speeches, reports by the U.S. 
government and the U.N, U.N resolutions, newspaper articles, and secondary resources, such as 
books and journal articles, have been used. 
1.5 Structure/ Organization  
Given this objective, the thesis is organised into five chapters: Chapter one, is the introductory 
chapter. It lays out the thesis to be addressed, the theoretical framework, the methodology and 
the structure of the thesis. 
 Chapter two focuses on the historical development of Iran’s nuclear program and how the 
U.S. has contributed to its growth. The chapter reviews the various policies adopted by 
successive U.S. governments, from Eisenhower to Carter in aiding the country’s nuclear program 
                                                          
32
 L. Carl Brown, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, (September/October 2006). 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61871/l-carl-brown/the-israel-lobby-and-us-foreign-policy (Accessed 
September 10, 2012). 
33
 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby, 2007.  
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from 1950 to 1979. What it demonstrates is that when Iran’s policies coincide with U.S. national 
interests, the latter was eager to help Iran on the nuclear front. 
 Chapter three examines the second stage in the relationship between the U.S. and Iran on 
the nuclear issue.  This is the period after the Islamic Revolution to the present.  It is one marked 
by hostility on both sides, and importantly, American attempts to contain Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions, particularly nuclear weapons development, and the latter’s efforts at circumventing 
this.  
 Chapter four examines U.S. national interests in the Middle East and the impact of Iran’s 
nuclear weapons program on these interests.  It helps to explain why there are different phases in 
the U.S. approach to Iran’s nuclear program.  
 Chapter five is the conclusion and it summarises the significant points in the thesis and 
indicates what likely future developments will be. 
.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ERA OF COOPERATION: THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM (1953-1978) 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter posited that the current standoff between the U.S. and Iran over the 
nuclear issue must be understood within the larger context of U.S. interests in the region, 
namely: (1) ensuring access to oil and gas; (2) ensuring the security of Israel, and (3) eliminating 
security threats to the U.S. emanating from the region. A historical overview of Iran-U.S. 
relations under various U.S. administrations reveals that these goals continue to be true over 
time. This chapter aims at putting the current tension and conflict within a historical context.  
What it argues is that historically, specifically when relations between the two states were 
cordial, there was significant cooperation between them on the nuclear issue.  More directly, the 
U.S. was the leading supporter of Iran’s nuclear energy program. A friendly Iran was not only an 
ally, but also a guarantor of U.S. interests in the region and hence the U.S. was eager to keep 
Tehran close, and that included perks such as allowing the regime to develop a nuclear program. 
However, it must be stressed, that the U.S. has only been interested in assisting Iran with its 
nuclear program for peaceful purposes. At no time in the relationship was there any hint that a 
nuclear Iran would be tolerated.   In the next chapter it will be shown that when Tehran began 
pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the U.S. took action against it, and this was made 
imperative too by the fact that a nuclear Iran was a major threat to global nuclear stability, but to 
U.S. interests in the region.   
The current chapter focusses on the period 1953 to 1979, the era of the Shah dynasty, 
when various American governments contributed to the development of a nuclear program in 
Iran.   
2.2 The Era of Cooperation Begins 
 The start of U.S. involvement in Iran began in earnest during the Cold War with 
Operation Ajax, a military coup in 1952 that was orchestrated by British and American 
 11 
 
intelligence.
34
 It overthrew the democratically elected and nationalistic government of Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and installed the pro-West Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi as 
the reigning Shah of Iran. (Under Mosaddegh’s nationalism, the Shah’s father , Reza Khan, later 
Reza Shah Pahlavi, had been relegated to a mere figure head having lost his control of the 
parliament which had once acted as a puppet to his regime, to the popular Mosaddegh). 
 Mosaddegh’s ousting was due to the threat he posed to the West.  His 1951 
nationalisation of the oil fields and refineries owned by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
represented a direct threat to British economic interests, while his overt courting of the 
Communist Tudeh Party during the Cold War made him the object of U.S. anger.  As a result, 
President Dwight Eisenhower and his British counterpart, Winston Churchill, gave the green 
light for a coup that proved successful.
35
 
 With the fall of Mosaddegh, the Americans rapidly began strengthening their presence in 
the country.  According to James Bill, “With the fall of Mosaddegh, the U.S. began to pour men, 
money, and machines into Iran at an unprecedented rate….American private and public 
economic and aid missions to Iran in the 1950s were numerous and varied and included western 
banking and investment in Iranian Industries.”36 As discussed below, various American 
administrations from Eisenhower to Carter made significant contributions to developing Iran’s 
nuclear program as Iran was promoted and protected U.S. interests of the region.  This situation 
continued until the Islamic Revolution in Iran and 1979 which saw the demise of the Shah and 
the end of U.S. friendly regimes in the country. 
2.3 The Eisenhower Administration 
 It can be argued that it was under President Dwight D. Eisenhower the close ties between 
Iran and the U.S. began, and it began with Iran’s adoption of the Eisenhower Doctrine and was 
cemented with Eisenhower’s visit to the country in 1959. This visit came at a time when 
neighbouring countries like Iraq had already developed close relations with the Soviet Union, 
                                                          
34
 See Sandra McKay, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of  a Nation  (New York: Dutton 1996). 
35
 James Bill, The Eagle and The Lion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988) , 119-120. 
36
 Bill, The Eagle, 119-120. 
 12 
 
thus rendering it crucial for the U.S. to secure its relations with other partners in the region to 
contain the Soviet threat.     
The Eisenhower Doctrine was, in essence, an anti-communist programme, and under its 
terms, any country could request American economic or military support if threatened with 
aggression.
37
 
 
Indeed, Iran was one of the first and among a very few ‘Third World’ countries 
that publicly endorsed the Doctrine.
38
 President Eisenhower recognized this when he stated, 
during his 1959 visit to Tehran, that the two countries share a special partnership, and when he 
assured the Iranian government that, for the remainder of his presidency, relations between the 
two nations would remain close.
39
  
The Eisenhower Doctrine and the stability of the regime were one of America’s bulwarks 
against communism in the region and a means of ensuring access to the region’s oil. During the 
Eisenhower presidency, this bulwark was buttressed with support to Iran from the U.S., in the 
form of the sale of weapons, and interestingly, in the form of aid to build Iran’s nuclear program 
under the Shah.   This aid was endorsed in the Atomic Energy Act itself. The Act, passed by the 
U.S. Congress in 1954, created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) “to encourage 
widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful 
purposes.”40  It also permitted private industries to get involved in the atomic energy business 
and it also endorsed U.S. assistance to ally nations building power-producing nuclear reactors.
41
  
Consequently, the Eisenhower Administration began to collaborate with the Shah in 
advancing Iran’s nuclear program. On March 5, 1957, Iran and the U.S. signed an agreement for 
cooperation in the civil use of atomic energy for five years, and the U.S. also agreed to provide 
Iran with nuclear reactor technology within the framework of the “Atoms for Peace” program.42   
The “Atoms for peace” program was introduced  by Eisenhower in a speech delivered to the 
United Nations General Assembly in December 1953, and it was the foundation of the U.S.’ 
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nuclear agreement with its allies around the world.
43 
 It was under the “Atoms for Peace” 
program that the U.S. signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran in 1957 that 
allowed for transfer of “technical assistance, the lease of several kilograms of enriched uranium 
and cooperation on researching the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”44 While Iran’s nuclear 
pursuits were to be for peaceful purposes only under the terms of the agreement, according to 
specialists in the area, there were only “limited real world controls” put in place”.45  Iran 
qualified for the program because it was a strong ally of the U.S. especially when it came to the 
issues of oil and Israel.   Iran also shared common security threats with the U.S., against which 
the nuclear program helped to guard. These included the dangers posed by Arab nationalism 
(Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt) and by radical pro–Soviet Arab states.46  
The entity promoting the cooperation was the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), a body established under the “Atoms for Peace” initiative.  The mandate of the IAEA 
included “providing strong global nuclear safety and security, and fostering the safe use of 
nuclear power by supporting nuclear programmes around the world.”47 This history is rather 
interesting in the current context where Iran and the IAEA are at odds over the former’s current 
nuclear program
.. 
One of the most important outcomes of the cooperation agreement between the U.S. and 
Iran was the decision by the Shah in 1959 to order the construction of the Nuclear Research 
Center at Tehran University (completion was in 1967), and which was supplied with a five 
megawatt (MW) thermal research reactor from the U.S.
48
  The Centre was to be under the 
operation of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. 
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2.4 The Kennedy Administration  
 With the change in administration from Eisenhower to Kennedy in 1961, there was also a 
shift in policy with respect to the importance accorded nuclear weapons.  According to Philip 
Nash, “the Kennedy administration sought to avoid a reliance on nuclear weapons by placing 
more emphasis on developing conventional capabilities especially airlift, sealift, and tactical air 
forces and unconventional capabilities, such as the Special Forces, as an alternative to 
’humiliation’ or ‘all-out nuclear action’.... Kennedy also sought to rely more than Eisenhower 
had, on foreign aid, propaganda, allies, and arms control.”49 Indeed, Kennedy was more willing 
to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.  
Based on this strategy, he signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) in August 1963.
50 
Because of the change in U.S. policy, there was less enthusiasm from the administration for 
supporting the nuclear programs of allies.  As a result, the Shah often criticised President 
Kennedy and he  used the fear of the spread of communism to convince the U.S. government to 
donate more financial aid and military support.
51
 
 However, the Kennedy administration considered economic and political reform as a 
precondition for any financial aid, or technology transfer to Iran.
 52 
2.5 The Johnson Administration 
Kennedy’s successor, President Lyndon Johnson, adopted similar policies towards Iran. 
As a result of ongoing U.S. pressure on Iran for economic and political reforms, and the U.S.’ 
decision to limit Iran’s access to weapons, the Shah began developing closer ties with the Soviet 
Union.  As a part of this cooperation, the Shah assured the Soviets in 1962 that he would not 
allow the establishment of foreign missile bases on Iranian territory if these were hostile to the 
Soviet Union.
53
 In addition, high ranking Soviet officials visited Iran in 1964, and the two 
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countries signed a trade agreement.
54
 One year later, in June 1965, the Shah also agreed to 
purchase $110 million of Soviet Union weapons.
55
 According to Warren Cohen, “the Iranian 
dissatisfaction with U.S. support in the 1960s encouraged them to adopt a more independent 
policy toward the U.S. by improving mutual relations with Moscow.”56 As the Shah’s 
relationship with the Soviet Union began to strengthen, it created concerns in the U.S., and this 
lead it to adopt a more flexible position towards the Shah’s request for more weapons.57 As a 
result, Iran - U.S. relations began to improve and were strengthened during President Richard 
Nixon’s term in office. 
2.6 The Nixon Administration 
Nixon considered the Shah as one of the important elements of stability in the Middle 
East. He disregarded any criticism of the Shah’s internal policies58 and in his doctrine, released 
in a press conference in Guam on July, 1969, he paid special attention to Iran. Under the Nixon 
Doctrine, the U.S. expected its allies to take more responsibility for their regional security and 
gave a large share of the cost and responsibility for the defence and containment of communism 
to the governments of its allies. However, the U.S. further guaranteed them the provision of 
military and economic assistance.
59
  
The Nixon Doctrine promoted a twin pillar policy in the Persian Gulf to maintain 
regional stability and containing communism.  This policy was deemed necessary due to the 
power vacuum created by the withdrawal of British forces from ‘East Suez’ in 1971.60 The twin 
pillars consisted of two regional hegemons, one responsible for economics and the other security.   
Saudi Arabia was to be the economic pillar and Iran the security pillar due to the latter’s military 
capabilities.  The military strength of Iran would not only help to contain threats to regional 
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peace, but it also reduced the need for America’s military presence in the region to combat 
communism – a major objective of the Nixon Doctrine.61    
 As President Nixon remarked to newsmen in Guam in July 1969: “ We shall provide a 
shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us...we shall furnish 
military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. 
But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of 
providing manpower for its own defense.”62   
Iran’s role in the region was justified by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who 
argued that not only was Iran capable of filling the void created by the departing British and 
serve as a bulwark against communism, but that the policy would not demand resources from the 
U.S. since the Shah would be able to purchase arms and equipment with income generated by his 
oil revenue.
63
  Indeed, as David Schmitz noted, between 1970 and 1975, Iran purchased $12.1 
billion worth of arms from the US.
64
 These purchases included advanced weapons technology, 
including nuclear technology. 
 However, other developments, including the oil crisis and regional conflicts, also 
accelerated Iran’s nuclear development.65   With the rising cost of oil during the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo in late 1973, the U.S. economy was 
confronted with a huge trade deficit.  At the same time, Iran’s revenues were soaring due to 
rising oil prices; it rose from $5.073 billion in 1973 to $18.672 billion in 1974 (representing a 
growth rate of 268%).
66
 In order to address America’s economic woes, the Nixon administration 
considered selling more arms, including nuclear equipment to Iran, to offset its trade deficit.
67
 
This also had the advantage of strengthening Iran’s military to fight against regional threats.  
                                                          
61
 Schmitz, The United States, 81.   
62 Quoted in Bernard Reich and and Stephen H. Gotowicki, “The United States and The Persian Gulf In The Bush 
Administration,” Brassey’s Defense Yearbook (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1991). 
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/usgulf.htm (Accessed May 29, 2012) 
63
 Schmitz, The United States, 82. 
64
 Schmitz, The United States, 82. 
65
 Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah," 213. 
66
 Mohammad Hassani and Afsaneh Dabbaghi, “Iran's Oil Revenues Fluctuations: Analysis of External and Internal 
Factors (1970-2007),” P.9. http://www.business.curtin.edu.au/files/Hassani_oil_Revenues_.pdf (Accessed 
November 07, 2011). 
67
 Nayef H.
 
Samhat, “Middle Powers and American Foreign Policy: Lessons from Irano-US. Relations, 1962-77,” 
Policy Studies Journal, 28, NO. 1(2000): 12. 
 17 
 
Conveniently too, the Iranian government was not reluctant to pay more money for modern 
weapons and this is reflected in Iran’s military expenditure, which increased by 600% between 
1972 and 1977.
68
 
Important developments also took place during this time in the advancement of Iran’s 
nuclear program, and these were again with the consent and cooperation of the U.S.  In March 
1974, the Shah announced his plans to develop 23,000 MW of nuclear power capacity, and this 
was followed two months later with a suggestion to Iranian officials by the Chairman of the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission, Dixy Lee Ray, to establish enrichment and reprocessing facilities 
in Iran.
69
 On March 3, 1975, Iran and the U.S. signed a $15 billion agreement for the 
construction of eight nuclear reactors in Iran.
70
 
2.7 The Ford Administration 
Under Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford, Iran’s nuclear development encountered some 
resistance.  There were concerns about the Shah’s growing military strength, his pursuit of 
increasingly sophisticated military hardware, including some of the most advanced U.S. planes 
and radar, and his growing nuclear program.
71 
 Some officials were concerned that he was 
interested in developing a nuclear bomb and as such increasing pressures were brought to bear 
on the Ford administration to halt the sale of nuclear materials and facilities to Iran.
72 
This led to 
tensions in relationship between the two countries.  However, because of the vulnerable position 
of the U.S. economically, and because of the eagerness of countries like France and Germany to 
sell nuclear facilities to the Shah, the U.S. reconsidered its hard-line approach and subsequently 
agreed to the weapons sales.
73
 President Ford approved the sale of eight nuclear reactors, along 
with uranium, and then cleared the sale of lasers with a known capability for uranium enrichment 
to Iran.
74
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2.8 The Carter Administration 
     In 1977, James Earl Carter was elected as U.S. President. President Carter believed that 
human rights should be paramount in U.S. foreign policy and that U.S. weapons sales overseas 
should be linked to human rights.
75
 In the first few months of office, Carter tried to distance 
himself from most of the Kissinger-Ford policies.
76
 
     Meanwhile, in Iran, the Shah was in an increasingly difficult situation during this period, not 
only because of the issue of human rights raised by Carter, but also because of his close 
relationship with Nixon, Ford and Kissinger.
77
 Indeed, the Shah feared the possibility that Carter, 
just like Truman or Kennedy, would try to pressure him to adopt political and economic reforms 
instead of allowing Iran to purchase whatever weapons it wanted from the U.S.
78
 
     However, despite Carter’s strong emphasis on political and economic reforms in his foreign 
policy, in practice, the Carter administration did not adopt any policies that substantially differed 
from those of his predecessors.
79
 Most of the officials in the Carter administration, including the 
National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Ambassador William Sullivan, were 
strongly against applying pressure on the Shah.
80
 In fact, Carter’s foreign policy team were 
convinced that the Shah’s policies directly benefited the U.S.  Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of 
State in the Carter administration, mentions four advantages for the U.S. and the countries of the 
Middle East of the Shah’s policy. The Shah provided economic assistance to countries in the 
region: he helped reduce tensions in Southeast Asia; he was a reliable supplier of oil to the West, 
because he did not participate in the 1973 Arab oil embargo; and he was Israel’s primary source 
of oil.
81
  
     Aware of the Shah’s concerns, President Carter wrote to him in February 1977 reassuring him 
of Iran’s importance to the U.S. and emphasising his (Carter’s) support for the Shah. Carter’s 
letter  mentions that the “particularly close ties which have existed between our two countries 
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since World War II are supported by a broad consensus in the U.S. that we share many vital 
mutual objectives and that it is in the national interest of our country to cooperate with yours.”82 
A few months later, in August 1977, President Carter started negotiating with the Shah over 
nuclear cooperation,
83
 and in essence began pursuing a nuclear relationship with Iran that 
duplicated that of his two predecessors,
84
  
          On April 12, 1977, Carter signed an agreement with the Shah to exchange nuclear 
technology and to cooperate in nuclear safety.
85
 On January 1, 1978, Carter visited Tehran and 
during his visit, the two states initiated a nuclear agreement in which Iran agreed to increase 
protection beyond the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) requirements, and in return the U.S. 
granted Iran "most favoured nation" status for reprocessing nuclear fuel.
86
 On July 10, 1978, the 
US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement (NEA) was signed. The purpose of the NEA was to 
facilitate cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and to govern the export and transfer of 
equipment and material to Iran's nuclear energy program. The U.S. also agreed to provide 
technology to help Iran in its search for uranium deposits.
87
 
     It is important to mention that the NEA and other nuclear agreements the Shah signed with 
European countries like Germany and France never bore fruit.  This meant that the U.S. was the 
major force in building Iran’s nuclear program. This situation persisted until the overthrow of the 
Shah in the 1979 the start of hostile relations between Iran and the U.S. As the above discussion 
has shown, the U.S contributed enormously to Iran’s nuclear program during the Shah’s reign, 
both for security and economic reasons.  Iran under the Shah was an American ally, and Iran’s 
role in the region under his reign advanced U.S. interests.  As such, Iran received significant help 
from the U.S. in building its nuclear program.  This situation however, changed dramatically 
with the new revolutionary Islamic regime that came to power in 1979 as discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FROM COOPERATION TO CONFLICT: THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS ON U.S.-IRAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION (1979 TO PRESENT) 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the fall of the Shah, the U.S. has adopted a hard line and very critical position with 
respect to Iran’s nuclear program. This stance is motivated not only by the fact that the regime in 
Iran is hostile to the U.S., but also because the latter claims it has evidence that Iran is pursuing a 
weapons program. Claims like satellite pictures from the Institute for Science and International 
Security (ISIS) which features construction of underground enrichment sites in Natanz and 
Esfahan. The revelation of Fardow nuclear site in 2009, evidence of plutonium production and 
uranium enrichment, and the trace of contamination from advanced enrichment effects in Natanz 
are some of the claims of evidence the U.S. make on Iran’s nuclear program.88   
So hostile are relations between the two states that in the U.S. and Israel, politicians 
publicly and regularly mention the possibility of one or both of these countries undertaking a 
bombing mission to destroy the former’s nuclear facilities which are seen as a threat to their 
security.  Iran has even charged that Israel and the U.S. have been assassinating its nuclear 
scientists as several of them have been killed mysteriously. The start of hostile relations between 
the U.S. and Iran can be traced to the Islamic Revolution and the virulent anti-Americanism that 
it inaugurated in the country. 
3.2 Background to the Islamic Revolution 
In order to understand the change in relations between Iran and the U.S., it is necessary to 
provide a brief overview of the factors behind the Islamic Revolution and the nature of the 
regimes that came to power after the Shah. 
 Iranians dissatisfaction with the Shah’s regime due to its political repression of 
opponents, its corrupt nature, its strong links to the U.S, its heavy emphasis on militarization, and 
                                                          
88
 Cordesman and Al-Rodhan,” Iranian Nuclear Weapons?,” 13 
 21 
 
the serious economic difficulties facing the nation and despite a huge oil income, led in the 
1970s to the emergence of a strong and determined opposition that eventually culminated in  the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979.
89
 Within the first few months after the Revolution, however, 
America took steps like giving asylum to the Shah and hesitating to return the Shah to Iran.  
Consequently the nature of relations between the two countries changed and became hostile.
90
 
The hostile relation between Iran and the U.S. escalated when in November 1979 U.S. officials 
in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran were attacked and taken hostage by Iranian revolutionary 
students. Responding to the situation in Iran, the Carter administration froze Iran’s assets in 
worth more than $10 billion in the U.S.
91
 The administration also blocked all U.S. cooperation 
with Iran, including Iran’s nuclear program.92 
3.3 Iran-U.S. Nuclear Relations after the Islamic Revolution 
3.3.1 The Reagan Administration 
 After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the new government inherited the Shah’s nuclear 
program. The revolutionary regime began a hostile relationship with the U.S. and suspended 
contracts that the Shah had signed with the U.S for nuclear reactors. All arms deals, amounting 
to around $34 billion worth of major projects, between Iran and the U.S. were also cancelled and 
these included the four nuclear power stations.
93
 
 The President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) under the Shah,         
Dr. Akbar Etemad, commented  that, “with regards to the AEOI, there was a tendency to destroy 
everything within it, and many people – professional and otherwise – had a say in the matter. 
The destructive forces of the revolution inside and outside the AEOI succeeded in bringing 
nearly all the projects to a halt; all the major projects were cancelled or left dormant.”94 
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 When President Ronald Reagan assumed office in the U.S., his administration’s policy 
toward Iran was influenced by the Iran- Iraq war.  Indeed, shortly after the Iranian Revolution, 
Iraq started a war with Iran. In the eyes of many, this was a war fought on behalf of the West to 
defeat the Islamic regime in Iran in order to protect U.S. interests in the region which was under 
threat from hostile regime.  For its part, the U.S. took an official position of strict neutrality in 
the first two years of the war. However, when Iran launched a successful military campaign in 
1982 and a subsequent offensive against Iraq, policymakers in the U.S. began to fear an outright 
Iranian victory.
95
 As a result, they came out openly in support of Iraq (the Iran-Contra affair, 
discussed below, notwithstanding) in the drive to isolate Iran and reduced it as a threat. 
     In 1982, the U.S. removed Iraq from the list of countries which they considered as supporting 
international terrorism
96
 and U.S. officials began to visit the country. In his book, Choice of 
Enemies, Lawrence Freedman mentions a high level official meeting between Donald Rumsfeld 
and Saddam Hussein in December 1983, and the conversation they had over the mutual interests 
of the two countries, one of which concerned dealing with the Iranian threat.
97
  In 1984, the U.S. 
officially restored its diplomatic relations with Iraq.
98
 Besides political and diplomatic support, 
Iraq benefited from security intelligence supplied through U.S. sources.
99
 In addition, Saudi 
Arabia, China, France and the U.S. also sold billions of dollars of arms to Iraq.
100
 During this 
period, with the exception of its relationship with Syria and the partial exception of Libya and 
Algeria, Iran found itself quite isolated.
101
  
     The Iran – Iraq war and then Iran’s isolation motivated the Iranian government to re-build its 
nuclear program.
102
 It should be noted that at the start of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had stopped 
working on its nuclear program because Ayatollah Khomeini believed nuclear weapons to be 
contrary to Islam.
103
  However, Saddam Hussein’s repeated use of chemical and biological 
weapons against Iranian troops, something forbidden by the 1952 Geneva Protocol, convinced 
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Iranian officials that
104
 leaders of the world’s most powerful nations could easily ignore incidents 
where the ‘red line’ was crossed, so long as it served their short and long term interests regarding 
the Islamic regime in Tehran.
105
 This view made Iran’s leaders more concerned about their future 
security and motivated them to look for a strong deterrent a nuclear arsenal.
106
  
     This return to a nuclear program, however, led the Reagan administration in the 1980s to 
organize a multilateral embargo on Iran due to concerns that the latter would misuse its nuclear 
technology and pursue a nuclear weapons program.  The Reagan led embargo succeeded in 
getting Europe to agree to rigorous export controls with respect to dual-use technologies.
107
 
Germany, for example was persuaded to abandon its cooperation with Iran’s nuclear program, 
particularly its work on the Busheher reactors.
108
  
     However, it must be mentioned that though the embargo delayed and slowed down Iran’s 
nuclear program, it did not prevent Iran from pursuing nuclear agenda. Iran violated the embargo 
and exploited the arms sales to Iran to advance its security interests elsewhere.  This resulted in 
the very embarrassing, for the U.S., Iran-Contra affair in 1986.  This, in essence, was an attempt 
to trade arms to Iran for the release of American hostages held in Lebanon by Hezbollah
109
  and 
to secure funds to support the Contras in Nicaragua.  While the U.S. Congress had banned the 
sale of arms to countries that sponsored terrorism (e.g. Iran), Oliver North, along with the 
cooperation of the CIA then headed by William Casey, sought to sell arms and spare parts to Iran 
with the collaboration of Israel, in order to get American hostages back to the U.S.
110
   
     There were also other factors aside from the hostage issue, according to Bill that influenced 
the arms sale to Iran. One had little to do with the Middle East, but it made for greater 
controversy at the time.  It was the fact that that the funds from the arms sale were used to 
support the Contra (hence Iran-Contra) , a surrogate U.S. army fighting to overthrow  the Marxist 
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Sandinistas in Nicaragua. This support for the Contras was a direct violation of the Boland 
Amendment which outlawed funding the Contras for the purposes of overthrowing the 
Sandinista government.  As a consequence of this, there were impeachment hearings in the 
Congress. 
     Another factor influencing the arms sale was Israel’s growing concern over Iraq’s power in 
the region, and as such Israel was interested in assisting Iran in order to weaken Iraq.
111
  Another 
factor Bill cites was Reagan’s concern about a possible Soviet incursion in the region.112  Based 
on a U.S intelligence report, “Khomeini’s position was faltering in Iran and the Soviet Union 
was poised ready to take advantage of his possible collapse”.113 In addition, there was the fear of 
a forceful exportation of the Iranian revolution to other Persian Gulf states that are crucial to U.S. 
interests – in particular Saudi Arabia, a country with one quarter of the world’s proven reserves 
of oil and a major supplier to the U.S.
114
 Finally, Bill mentions that, “economically, Iran and the 
U.S had common interests on oil price during this period. Within the halls of OPEC, the Islamic 
Republic had long struggled for lower production and higher prices. The U.S meanwhile, needed 
prices high enough to protect the domestic oil industry but low enough to placate the 
consumer.”115  Bill then argues that “the Iran-Contra affair did not  succeed because it was 
operated by the wrong people, supported by the wrong allies (Israel), in the wrong place 
(Tehran), at the wrong time (during the month of Ramadan and after the United States had titled 
to the Iraqi side during the Gulf war) and implemented the wrong tactical plan.”116 
3.3.2 The Bush I Administration  
    During President Gorge Herbert Walker Bush’s administration, the policy to preclude Iran’s 
acquiring nuclear weapons continued.  However, the vacuum created by the U.S. was soon filled 
by the Russians and Iran’s nuclear program was once again jump started. 
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     Initially, global changes seemed to offer openings for a lowering of hostilities between the 
U.S. and Iran. The fall of the Berlin Wall, which brought an end to the Cold War and the threat 
of Communism, meant that Iran-Soviet links would not necessarily be perceived as a threat.  
Further, when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990,   Iran stayed on the sidelines without any 
serious opposition to the American-led coalition.
117
  In his public speech in January 1989, Bush 
seemed to send a message to American foes, including Iran, by suggesting that good will conduct 
will be met with good will.  He noted:   “Today there are Americans who are held against their 
will in foreign lands and Americans who are unaccounted for. Assistance can be shown here and 
will be long remembered. Good will begets good will.”118  In addition to Bush’s speech, the 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft mentioned that America “had a positive view toward 
expanding its relation with Iran.”119  However, these did not really bear fruit. 
     Iranian officials recognised these statements from administration officials as a sign that they 
would be rewarded if they cooperated in obtaining the release of the hostages in the Lebanon.
120
 
However, when Iran succeeded in getting the hostages released, Tehran did not receive the 
reward it had expected as there was no change in U.S policy.
121
 Pollak explains this by 
suggesting that the previous U.S. administration’s experience, as with the Contra affair, made 
Bush more cautious about Iran.
122
  In addition,  the Iranian government and its agents did many 
other belligerent things such as murdering the Shah’s last Prime Minister, Shapour Bkhtiar, in 
Paris and killing other opponents of the regime in Vienna and Berlin.
123
These events ensured that 
no one in Washington was interested in considering improving relations with Iran.
124
 Also, the 
fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini against Salman Rushdie in 1989 for his book The Satanic 
Verses  (which was considered as an insult to the Quran), made the situation more 
complicated.
125
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With respect to the nuclear issue, not surprisingly, U.S. hostility to Iran’s program 
continued. As a matter of fact, there was an intensification of the sanctions against Iran. In an 
article in the Los Angeles Times entitled “Iran’s Nuclear Plans Worry U.S. Officials,” published 
in 1991, Jim Mann explained that “some Bush Administration officials and independent nuclear 
specialists here have grown increasingly worried about new signs that Iran may be starting down 
the same path as Iraq ... with secret efforts by Iran to buy nuclear technology and build nuclear 
weapons.”126  Iran moved much closer to countries like the Soviet Union, China and Pakistan for 
the supply of nuclear technology.
127
 In March 1990, Iran and the Soviet Union signed their first 
protocol on the Bushehr nuclear plant, which the Soviet Union agreed to complete and in 
addition, build two more nuclear reactors in Iran.
128
  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran 
began nuclear cooperation with Russia, signing a bilateral agreement in August, 1992.
129
  Russia 
provided Iran with fuel fabrication technology and even uranium enrichment centrifuge plans.
130
  
This Russian –Iranian collaboration was of great concern to the U.S. and the latter tried to 
use threats and incentives to undermine it. However, although the U.S. administration used 
warnings, selective sanctions, and even the promise of expanded economic ties with Russia, the 
U.S. did not achieve significant success. Iran’s nuclear program continued to benefit from 
external support from Russia.
131 
 
3.3.3 The Clinton Administration 
When President Bill Clinton assumed office in 1993, relations between the U.S and Iran 
continued to be hostile as Iran continued to be seen as a major threat to U.S. interests.  Memories 
of the1979-1980 Americans hostages, the 1980s Iran-Contra affair, Iran’s sponsorship of 
terrorism abroad, Iran’s efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and Iran’s opposition to 
the Arab-Israeli peace process, prevented the Clinton administration from formulating any new 
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policies on cooperation with Iran.
132  
Despite attempts to improve relations between the two 
countries, especially after the election of the reformist President Mohammad Khatami in Iran, 
Iran’s opposition towards the Arab-Israel peace process, their support for groups engaged in 
terrorist activities, and their suspected pursuit of a nuclear program, convinced U.S. officials that 
containment, rather than engagement, was the best approach.
133
  
     The Clinton administration’s main policy towards Iran was part of a strategy which came to 
be known as “dual containment”134 and the main purpose of this was to increase pressure on the 
two Middle Eastern countries, Iran and Iraq, in order to isolate them politically, economically 
and militarily.
135
 Indeed, Clinton sought to contain Iraq, a close U.S. ally, because of Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and Iraq’s close relation with Russia. 
     In an article on Foreign Affairs in March 1994, Anthony Lake, the then National Security 
Advisor to President Clinton, mentioned that Iran challenged America’s interests by its actions 
on several fronts and these included: “1) Its search for weapons of mass destruction; 2) Its 
sponsorship of terrorism and assassinations (including the assassination of Shapour Bakhtiar, the 
last Prime Minister under Shah Pahlavi); 3) Its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process; 4) 
Its pursuit of offensive weapons;  and 4) Its exploitation of difficult situations with U.S. allies 
(like the bombing of Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires).”136Based on these observations, Lake 
concluded in his article that dual containment is “a realistic and sustainable policy which is 
meant to protect America’s interests in the Middle-East, stabilize international politics, and 
enlarge the community of nations committed to America’s core values.137  
Containment of Iran under Clinton was especially evident in the administration’s efforts 
to punish the country economically.   On March 7, 1995, when Conoco Oil Company announced 
it had signed a contract with Iran to develop the Sirri Island oil field in the Persian Gulf, there 
was a strong reaction from the Clinton administration and they issued Presidential Order, 12957, 
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banning the participation of U.S. companies from any investment in the Iranian petroleum 
industry.
138
 Because of the Order, Conoco cancelled a $1 billion contract with the Iranian 
government.
139
  
  The order prohibiting U.S. companies from investments in Iran and the cancellation of 
the Conoco Oil deal came less than three months after Iran had signed an agreement with Russia 
to build a nuclear research reactor at the Bushehr nuclear plant. 
Pressure on Iran increased in May 1995, when Clinton issued another Presidential Order, 
12959, prohibiting all trade, investments and commercial transactions with Iran, including that 
done by foreign subsidiaries of American corporations included in the ban.
140
 It should be noted 
however, the U.S. did not receive much help from its European allies or other countries in the 
region as they were benefiting too much from their economic relationship with Iran.  For 
example, at the same time the U.S. was prohibiting any trade and investment in the Iranian 
economy, Total, a French corporation, signed a $1 billion agreement to develop two off-shore oil 
fields.
141
  
To ramp up further the pressure on Iran, Clinton signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 
(ILSA) of 1996 which imposed a number of sanctions against foreign firms investing more than 
$20 million in Iran's oil and gas industry.
142
 The Clinton administration was hoping to  weaken 
Iran financially in order to prevent it from developing its nuclear program, as well as to reduce 
its support for organizations recognized as terrorist groups by the U.S.
143
 However, since 
European countries were benefiting from Iran’s oil and gas industry, they were against these 
investment limitations. In 1998, under the influence of certain European countries and American 
companies, President Clinton waived sanctions  that prohibited investments in  Iran by  some 
companies that were active in Iran’s oil and gas industries, like France's Total, Russia’s  
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Gazprom, and Malaysia’s  Petronas.144 Following this, President Clinton also ended sanctions on 
food and medicine to Iran, Libya and the Sudan. One can deduce that oil security for U.S. allies 
was threatened and hence the administration felt pressured to waive these sanctions.  With 
respect to the issue of food and medicines, Clinton’s Secretary of State, Stuart Eizentat explained 
that these were not generally considered as part of a nation’s military capability and did not 
constitute support for terrorism.
145 
As a result of these actions by the U.S., the extraterritorial 
sanctions against Iran became ineffective.
146
  
 During Clinton’s presidency, as with that of President Bush Senior, Iran considerably 
expanded its nuclear cooperation with other countries and disregarded all sanctions imposed by 
the U.S. on its nuclear activities. In fact, the U.S. was not successful in preventing European 
countries or Japan, China or Russia from dealing with Iran. As Pollak mentions, “even by 1995, 
the U.S was Iran’s third largest trading partner, Iran’s sixth largest purchaser of exports and the 
largest consumer of Iran’s oil. Because of this, Europe, Japan and Russia considered the 
sanctions imposed by the U.S as a barrier which merely reduced their benefits from dealing with 
Iran, while American companies were hugely benefiting from their transactions with Iranian 
companies.”147  
 Because of the inconsistencies in the U.S. policy towards Iran, Iran continued to develop 
its nuclear capability during Clinton’s term in office, regardless of international pressure and 
U.S. sanctions. 
3.3.4 The Bush II Administration  
 At the time of the election of President George Bush in the U.S. in 2000, Iran was at the 
bottom of Bush’s list of priorities.148 In fact, in the first year of the Bush administration, little 
attention was paid to Iran and its nuclear program.
149 
However, the September 11 terrorist attack 
of 2001 in the U.S., along with the Iranian exile group, Mojahedin Khalgh, revealed the 
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existence of Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz in August 2002, raising U.S. concerns about Iran’s 
nuclear program. 
 The Bush administration recognised Iran as a ‘Rogue State’ inimical to U.S. security and 
national interests.
 
Incidents such as the January 3, 2002 Israeli interception of the Karine A ship 
on the Red Sea explains why.  The ship, belonging to Iran, is alleged by the U.S. and Israel to 
have had 50 tons of weapons destined for Palestine, and this influenced the U.S. to adopt more 
hostile policies toward Iran. 
150
 
 On January 29, 2002, in a speech to the State of the Union, President Bush characterized 
Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’151 that threatened world 
peace.
 
In June 2003, Bush announced that the international community “will not tolerate the 
construction of nuclear weapons in Iran. Bush further mentioned that Iran would be dangerous if 
they had nuclear weapons.”152 At the time Bush made these statements, European countries like 
France and Germany were actively involved in negotiations to stop Iran’s nuclear program. On 
October 21, 2003, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Union [EU], Dominique de 
Villepin, Jack Straw and Joschka Fisher, began to negotiate directly with the then Iranian 
government.
153
 EU Ministers succeeded in signing an agreement with Iran, under which Iran 
agreed to suspend its nuclear enrichment programme.
154
 However, because pledges, like the 
Paris Agreement in November 14, 2004, made by the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers to Iran were 
not fulfilled, Iran announced in 2005 that it had restarted its nuclear program.
155
 The U.S. 
decided to become more directly involved in Iran’s nuclear program negotiation after Iran made 
this announcement. This new approach meant more cooperation between the U.S. and the EU 
and more broadly speaking support for the EU initiative, which Washington embraced 
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sceptically and conditionally in March, 2005.
156
 In embracing the EU initiative, Bush announced 
that “he is willing to help European countries in their negotiations with Iran over its nuclear 
program” 157 
 In August 2005, after a long delay in nuclear negotiations, the EU, with the support of the 
U.S., offered Iran a package of incentives: the so-called “Framework for a Long-term 
Agreement”.  This package included lifting sanctions imposed by the U.S. on Iran’s entry into 
the World Trade Organization and the sale of spare parts to Iranian civilian airliners.
158
 However, 
Iran rejected these offers and indicated that it was going to resume its uranium conversion 
activities.
 159
 
 When Iran made this announcement, the U.S. wanted to refer Iran to the UNSC and in 
2006; the EU began to support the U.S. on its position regarding this. The EU again halted its 
negotiations with Iran.
160
  As a result of the stalemate, the international community, including the 
EU and the U.S., took a firmer stance on Iran. These countries changed their policy from 
negotiation to coercive diplomacy in order to put pressure on the Iranian government to stop its 
nuclear program. In fact, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors 
voted in an emergency meeting to refer Iran to the UNSC. Iran responded to the IAEA by 
threatening to prevent further IAEA monitoring on its nuclear facilities and to fully resume 
uranium enrichment activities.
161 
 
 Iran was finally referred to the UNSC and in 2006; the UNSC passed its first resolution, 
1737, on Iran’s nuclear program. Under this resolution, Iran was called upon to suspend all 
nuclear enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.
162
 It was also required to provide the 
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IAEA with any information and cooperation the agency needed to ensure that the nuclear 
program was purely for peaceful energy production. Iran did not comply with these demands and 
continued its nuclear enrichment activities.
 163
 
 In 2007, the Bush administration maintained pressure on Tehran. It implemented a 
second set of UNSC backed sanctions and it adopted a new policy to limit Iran's access to the 
international financial system.
164
 In fact, the U.S. imposed sanctions on three major banks owned 
by the Iranian government as these banks were seen as providing financial support to Shiite 
group in Iraq, Hamas and Hezbollah.
165
 Also, to further isolate Iran from the rest of the world, 
the U.S. started a security dialogue with Iran's neighbours in the Persian Gulf and embraced new 
strategies aimed at promoting peace and negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.
166
 
  These policies seemed to have had some impact on Iran’s nuclear agenda.  On December 
3, 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released a report on Iran’s nuclear 
program. In the report, it was mentioned that the U.S. intelligence community believed Iran had 
“with moderate confidence not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007.”167  
However, the NIE report did not change U.S. policy toward Iran and Bush still held that Iran and 
its nuclear program was a serious threat to U.S. security.
168
 Bush constantly rejected any direct 
diplomatic discussions on nuclear issues with Iran and insisted that Iran freeze its uranium 
enrichment before the U.S would join negotiations.  
 However, it must be mentioned that in Bush’s last year in office, the U.S. changed its 
position and got involved in multilateral negotiations with Iran through the EU and P5+1 
(Permanent Five members of the UNSC plus Germany). Accordingly, in 2008, the Bush 
administration which had previously insisted that Iran freeze its uranium enrichment incentive 
before the U.S would join negotiations, agreed to send a senior representative under the then 
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Secretary of State for Political Affairs, William Burns, to a meeting in Geneva, but despite this 
development, Iran continued to reject U.S. preconditions.
169
 Bush agreed to send a representative 
to Geneva as a sign of America’s commitment to diplomacy.170  
 Despite concerns growing in the U.S. regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the election of 
Mohammad Khatami, the reformist president of Iran in 1997, and mutual interests, for example, 
the fight against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, brought Iran and the U.S. into some 
form of cooperation. For instance, Iranian officials became actively engaged in the ‘Six plus two’ 
talks and supported the U.S. war in Afghanistan, whilst most of the members of the ‘Six plus 
two’ opposed it.171 These talks refer to a coalition of the six states bordering on Afghanistan, plus 
Russia and the United States, who engaged in discussions from 1999 to 2001 to find a resolution 
amongst the Afghan Northern Alliance and ways of containing the Taliban. 
3.3.5 The Obama Administration 
 When Barack Obama assumed the office of U.S President, the Obama administration 
believed there was an opportunity to dissuade Iran from expanding its nuclear program, and 
possibly to build a new framework of relations with Iran after decades of estrangement and 
enmity.
172
 Obama tried to take a different approach that the previous Bush administration and be 
more conciliatory to the region in an effort to reduce the rampant anti-Americanism and the 
security threats facing the U.S. 
 In the first half of 2009, the Obama administration made a great effort, both in public and 
private, to encourage Iran to engage in diplomatic dialogue on its nuclear program.
173 
Obama 
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repeatedly stressed on “new beginnings” and “engagement based on mutual interest and mutual 
respect” in his speeches to Iran in Prague, Ankara, and Cairo. 174 
 Obama’s approach to handling Iran’s nuclear program was made clear in his message to 
Iran on March 21, 2009, the traditional Iranian New Year. In his message, the President made 
mention of the formal name of Iran- the Islamic Republic of Iran- and also referred to the 
historically great Persian civilization. Some scholars interpreted Obama’s reference to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran as an acceptance of Iran’s regime. Others were of the view that Obama 
would not pursue the policy of ‘regime change,’ which had been part of the U.S agenda 
regarding Iran for over thirty years.
175
 Obama also talked about the need for mutual respect 
between the two countries, which had not been U.S. policy toward Iran for decades.
176
  
Moreover, another important approach in Obama’s handling of Iran’s nuclear program 
was the elimination of any preconditions on Iran’s attendance at nuclear negotiations with the 
IAEA.
177
 
The Obama administration pursued an engagement policy with Iran.
178
 The 
administration participated in the Geneva meeting on Iran’s nuclear program along with the 
P5+1 and the Obama administration considered this meeting as a “constructive beginning” for 
negotiations. Some scholars consider the Geneva meeting as the most important proposal since 
the Paris agreement of November, 2004, under which Iran had agreed to a voluntary freezing of 
its enrichment program. The international community saw this as a good chance to recover trust 
on both sides over nuclear negotiations.
179
 
 
In the Geneva meeting, the Iranian government 
submitted a proposal to the P5+1. Iran’s proposal was based on exchanging a major portion of its 
minimally enriched uranium with more highly enriched fuel rods for the American-built research 
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reactor in Tehran, although Iran had already stated it would only discuss their nuclear issues with 
the IAEA.
 180
 
 Despite this development, by early summer, 2010, it had become clear that the possibility 
of a mutual agreement was not feasible.
181 
Iran did not accept a drafted technical agreement 
negotiated at the IAEA, but it did, however, offer a series of alternative proposals.
182
 Washington 
rejected these proposals, and in cooperation with the EU, the U.S publicly announced they would 
further reduce trade and financial interaction with Iranian companies.
183
 Although further talks 
were continued in Geneva in December, 2010, and in Istanbul in January, 2011, there were no 
convincing results for either side.
184 
 
 The failure of the Geneva negotiations and the revelation by Iran of a new nuclear facility 
near Qom (Fardow, Iran) in September, 2009, led to UNSC Resolution 1929 in June, 2010, and a 
series of additional unilateral measures by the U.S., including the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions 
and Disinvestment Act of July, 2010 (CISADA), aimed at more restrictions on the Iranian 
economy. The EU also imposed its own sanctions, notably EC Council Regulation, 961, of 
October, 2010, which focused on energy, shipping and other sectors of the Iranian economy. 
Several other countries, including Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway and South Korea also 
imposed sanctions on Iran.
185 
 
 Obama’s engagement policy failed due to Iran’s refusal of the nuclear agreement in 
Geneva on October 1, 2009, and because of unrest in Iran after the 2009 election, combined with 
direct criticism of Iran on the part of the U.S. for its use of force against protesters
186
 In addition, 
the Obama Administration considered Iran as one of the key national security challenges to the 
U.S.
187 Many officials in Obama’s administration believed that “the engagement policy alone is 
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not an effective way to thwart Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and diplomacy’s best chance 
of success requires all elements combining pressure and incentives to work simultaneously.”188 
 In addition, the high level of America’s distrust in Iran, and the persistent lobbying of the 
neo-conservatives and pro-Israeli interest groups in the U.S made it difficult for Obama to 
uphold his engagement policy.
189
 In the policy of ‘bigger carrots and bigger sticks,’ which is a 
more diplomatic and more aggressive method of engagement, Obama considered the ’bigger 
stick’ as a more effective way to deal with Iran and its nuclear activities.190 
 To be concise, both Presidents Bush and Obama actively attempted to prevent Iran from 
developing its nuclear programs through measures such as isolation and sanctions as they, like 
their predecessor, perceived Iran as a threat to U.S. interests. However, in the midst of all this 
international pressure, Iran continued to build its nuclear reactors. 
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CHAPTER 4 
U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE-EAST AND IRAN’S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM  
4.1 Introduction 
 As observed above, the U.S adopted hostile measures, including sanctions to prevent Iran 
from developing its nuclear weapons program. The pertinent question to ask then is why has the 
U.S. been so aggressive in halting Iran’s nuclear weapons program?  
 According to the U.S. National Strategy Report in May, 2010, the United States has great 
interests in the Middle East. The report mentioned that “these interests include broad cooperation 
on a wide range of issues with our close friend, Israel, and an unshakable commitment to its 
security; the unity and security of Iraq; the transformation of Iranian policy away from its pursuit 
of nuclear weapons, support for terrorism, and threats against its neighbours; non-proliferation; 
and counterterrorism cooperation, access to energy, and integration of the region into the global 
market.”191 In essence, U.S. interests are rooted in oil, Israel and security.  
4.2 Oil 
 As stated in the May, 2010, U.S National Strategy Report, the need for a stable and secure 
flow of energy or oil has dominated U.S. policy on the Middle East since World War II.
192
 In fact, 
the principal goal of the U.S. national security policy since then, and especially since the 1970s, has 
been to guarantee the stable and secured flow of oil from the Middle-East to the U.S. and its allies 
around the world, even through the use of military force.
193
 Indeed, the announcement of the Carter 
Doctrine after the fall of the Shah in 1979, the emergence of the Khomeini regime in Iran, along 
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan strongly demonstrates this approach.  In his Doctrine, 
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President Carter mentions that “any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf 
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such 
an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”194 This statement 
shows the commitment of the U.S, including the use of military force to secure the stable flow of oil 
from the Middle East 
 According to a report by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) the percentage share of the Middle East's total oil production in the world in 
2002 was 28.4%.
195
 The report went further to propose that the world’s demand for oil production 
from the Middle East may increase to more than 43% in 2030.
196
 The report concluded that the 
world’s dependence on energy from the Middle East states would increase substantially over the 
next two decades.
197 
 
 The above mentioned figure shows that, since the demand for petroleum is expected to 
increase by at least 50% over the next 20 years, only the Middle East has both the reserves and 
the production capacity to satisfy much of this demand.
198
 
Moreover, the cheap production costs of oil in the Middle East and the minimum capital 
required to increase production capacity there will greatly increase dependence on Middle 
Eastern oil reserves in the future.
199
 Therefore, due to the vital role that oil reserves in the Middle 
East play in the world’s economy, and especially the U.S economy, consistent access to oil from 
the Middle East is one of the most important reasons for U.S. interests there. Table 1 shows the 
contribution of oil from the Middle East to the U.S economy from 2005 to 2010.  
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Table 1: U.S. Crude Oil Imports (Annual-Thousand Barrels Per Day). 
           Year 
 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
All countries 
 
13,714 
 
13,707 
 
13,468 
 
12,915 
 
11,691 
 
11,793 
 
Middle East 
 
2423 
 
2300 
 
2236 
 
2233 
 
1705 
 
1750 
Percentage share 
of crude oil 
 
17.67% 
 
16.78% 
 
16.60% 
 
17.29% 
 
14.58% 
 
14.84% 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
200
  
 As shown in Table 1, despite the political and economic instability of the Middle East 
from 2005 to 2010 and the decrease in oil production around the world, oil imports from the 
Middle East alone contributed enormously to the U.S. economy during this period. In 2010, 15% 
of the 11,793 barrels of oil imported into the U.S. came from the Middle East. Because of the 
crucial role that these Middle Eastern oil imports play in the U.S economy, tied up with the 
effect of treasury bonds and other investments that Middle Eastern countries have on the U.S 
economy, any political or economic unrest in the Middle East and Persian Gulf states can 
generate a huge oil price hike, inflation, and subsequently dangerous economic problems in 
industrialised countries like the U.S. The 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) oil price crisis and 1979 Iranian Revolution, both of which propelled an increase in oil 
price and subsequent economic crises in the U.S., clearly illustrate how instability in the Middle 
East can affect oil price and the U.S. economy. Indeed, During the Arab oil embargo in 1973, the 
price of crude oil jumped by over 300%, from $US2.37 to $US11.51 per barrel within a few 
months.
201
 The increase in oil price cost the U.S. double the rate of inflation from 3.3% in 1972 
to 6.2% in 1973 and 11% in 1974. It also created a total unemployment rate of 8.5% in the U.S. 
in 1975.
202
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 The 1979 Iranian Revolution also had a serious impact on production and the fluctuation 
of oil prices in the global market.
203
 As a result of the Revolution, crude oil prices almost tripled 
from $13 per barrel in 1978 to $34 in 1981.
204
 In the U.S. alone, the Gross National Product 
(GNP) decreased to below 3.6%.
205 
 
 Because oil reserves in the Middle East, and especially in the Persian Gulf, play such a 
crucial role in the U.S. economy, the secure and stable flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and 
the Straits of Hormuz, the most strategically significant transit chokepoint in the world, with 
about one-fifth of the world’s oil traffic passing through it, is vital to the U.S. and its allies.206 
Because the U.S. imports about 25% of its oil via the Straits of Hormuz,
207
 keeping the Straits 
opened and secure comprises a crucial aspect of U.S. national interests in the Middle East and 
Persian Gulf.      
 It must also be mentioned that one of the most serious concerns of the international 
community and the U.S. is that Iran would use the leverage of nuclear capability to disrupt the 
flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz, in order to achieve its political and economy goals, if 
it were able to develop its nuclear program.
208
 The U.S and her allies again fear that it would be 
possible for Iran to threaten the use of its nuclear weapons as an umbrella to close the Straits of 
Hormuz.
209
 It has been estimated that even a 3 month closure of the Straits could cost the U.S. a 
4% -5% decreases in GDP, with an up to 2% unemployment rate and 7% inflation rate.
210
 
 At the beginning of 2010, when the Iranian government missed the deadline set by the 
Obama administration to open its secret uranium enrichment plant in Qom up to international 
inspection and to send any already enriched uranium abroad to be reprocessed into fuel, the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) held manoeuvres in the Persian Gulf and the Straits 
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of Hormuz.
211
 In December, 2011, because of sanctions imposed on Iran and its debilitating 
effect on their economy, Iran threatened to block the Straits of Hormuz.
212
 In fact, Iran’s threats 
regarding the Straits of Hormuz was in response to U.S. preparations to impose tougher sanctions 
that would ban dealings with Iran's Central Bank. The sanctions also targeted Iran’s oil sector. 
 These sanctions, if imposed, would deeply hurt Iran's oil exports, since most countries 
and companies use the bank to conduct purchases of Iranian crude oil.
213
 The actions of Iran in 
the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz increased concern amongst U.S. policymakers in the 
sense that any disruption of oil supply from the Straits would increase oil price dramatically and 
create a physical shortage of oil. This had the potential to deliver a catastrophic shock to the 
global economy.
214
 For example, in the recent U.S. – Iran confrontation, oil prices increased by 
$4 on Tuesday, January 03, 2012, from $107 to $111, after Iran’s threat to close the Straits of 
Hormuz.
215
   
 The U.S. considers the stable flow of oil through the Straits as crucial to U.S. national 
and security interests in the Middle East. This has caused the U.S. increasing anxiety for many 
years regarding the realities of being associated with Iran’s nuclear program and its threat to the 
transit of oil through the Straits of Hormuz.
216 
Thus, it can be argued that the security threat to 
the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, and particularly via the Straits of Hormuz, is one of 
the major reasons why the U.S. is opposed to Iran’s nuclear program. 
4.3 Israel 
 Although the stable flow of energy from the Middle East is of great interest to the U.S., 
the close relationship between the U.S and Israel on a broad range of issues is another reason 
why the U.S. is against Iran’s nuclear program. In this section, I will argue that Israel, as the 
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main ally of the U.S. in the Middle East, has strong financial, military, diplomatic and political 
ties with the U.S., which has integrated Israel into U.S. national interests there. Because Iran’s 
nuclear program is a threat to Israel’s interests in the Middle East, the U.S. wishes to prevent Iran 
from developing it.   
 Three main points are presented in this section to back up my argument. First, the high 
level of financial and military assistance provided by the U.S. to Israel since the creation of the 
State of Israel after World War II (WWII) has been a major reason for cementing U.S. interests 
with Israel in the Middle East. Secondly, the strong diplomatic support for Israel on the part of 
the U.S. in international organizations, such as the UN and the IAEA, also strengthens the 
relationship between the two countries. Finally, the presence of a strong Israel community and 
Israel lobbyists in the U.S. is another reason why the U.S. government considers Israel as part of 
its national interests in the Middle East. These points are explained below.  
 In “The World without Zionism,” a conference held in Tehran on October 26, 2005, the 
Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for the destruction of the State of Israel. 
Ahmadinejad mentioned that, “the occupying regime must be wiped off the map.”217 In this 
statement, the “occupying regime” was used in reference to the establishment of the State of 
Israel on land claimed by Palestinians. In another speech in the Iranian city of Zahedan, 
Ahmadinejad asserted that “the murder of six million Jews during World War II is a myth.” In 
addition, he called for Europe, North America or even Alaska to host a Jewish state, but not the 
Middle East.
218
 
 This rhetoric has been repeated on several occasions by Iranian officials on different 
platforms since the Islamic Revolution, raising concern in the U.S. over a nuclear Iran becoming 
a threat to Israel’s security. Since their unshakable commitment to Israel’s security, as mentioned 
in the May, 2010, U.S. National Strategy Report, is a matter of U.S. interest in the Middle East, 
Iran’s nuclear activities are seen as a threat to the security of Israel and also to these U.S. 
                                                          
217
 Presidency Of The Islamic Republic Of Iran, “World without Zionism,” October 26, 2005. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060625220249/http://www.president.ir/farsi/ahmadinejad/speeches/1384/aban-
84/840804sahyonizm.htm (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
218
 British Broadcasting Cooperation. Iranian leader denies Holocaust, December 14, 2005.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4527142.stm  (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
 43 
 
interests. In a speech by President Bush on his visit to Israel on January 6, 2008, Bush declared, 
“If Iran did strike Israel... we will defend our ally (Israel), no ands, ifs, or buts.”219  
 The U.S. – Israel relationship, as mentioned earlier, began with the creation of the State 
of Israel. On May 14, 1948, the U.S., under President Harry Truman, became the first country to 
recognize the State of Israel. Since then, the U.S has provided a great deal of financial and 
military assistance, e.g. a $100 million loan to Israel in 1949.
220
 Since then, U.S. financial and 
military assistance to Israel has been increasing dramatically. It must be emphasised, however, 
that the U.S. is not the only country that provides economic aid to Israel. Another country that 
supports and provides Israel with advanced military equipment and technology is France, but 
even though France and other European countries have been providing military and financial 
assistance to Israel for several years, the U.S. still remains their main supporter. Even after the 
Six Day War between Israel and Egypt in 1967, and following Israel’s victory, when it was able 
to demonstrate its military superiority in the region, U.S. aid to Israel still increased 
unprecedentedly and rose by 450%.
221
 Again, the Johnson Administration agreed to sell Phantom 
aircraft to Israel in 1968 with the strong support of the U.S. Congress.
222
 
 Indeed, U.S. aid to Israel amounted to $3.2 billion from 1949 to 1973. Between 1974 and 
1997, however, U.S. aid to Israel increased to a total of $75 billion.
223
 This aid was in the form of 
financial and military assistance. On the other hand, in recent years and with the rapid economic 
growth of Israel, almost all U.S. aid to Israel has been in the form of military assistance.
224
 In 
2008, Israel did not receive an Economic Support Fund in the form of aid from the U.S.
225
 In the 
same year, in the wake of cuts in economic assistance; the U.S. increased its military aid to Israel 
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from $1.8 billion to $2.4 billion.
226
 Table 2 shows the amount of U.S. military aid to Israel from 
2009 to 2011.  
Table 2: The United States Military Aid to Israel (Fiscal Year 2009 - Fiscal Year 2011) 
                 Fiscal Year  
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
Amount in Billion 
U.S Dollars 
 
2.55 
 
2.77 
 
3.00 
Source: Federation of American Scientists
227
 
 In fact, the increase in U.S. military assistance to Israel is rooted in a Memorandum of 
Understanding signed by the Bush administration in 2007.
228
 In this memorandum, the U.S. 
pledged $30 billion security assistance to Israel over a 10-year period.
229
  
The agreement calls for incremental annual increases in Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) to Israel. As shown in Table 2, U.S. military assistance increased from $2.55 billion in the 
fiscal year 2009, to $3 billion in the fiscal year 2011.
230 
Scholars like Miller have argued that the 
agreement U.S had with Israel was vital as Israel faced multiple security threats, including 
threats from a nuclear Iran and missile attack by organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah that 
are recognised as terrorist organisations by the U.S. and Israel. Miller further argued that the 
growing arsenals of these terrorist groups, especially the expanding power of Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, as well as the imminent danger of Iran, demonstrates how essential it is to preserve 
Israel's regional strategic security in the Middle East.
231 
 
 Because of Iran’s nuclear program and the threat of terrorist attack from Hamas and 
Hezbollah, as well as ongoing instability in the Middle East, many pro-Israeli groups in the U.S., 
including the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), believe that it would be 
beneficial for the U.S. to keep its commitment to Israel’s security in future, since Israel is the 
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only stable and pro-Western democratic state that can protect U.S. interests in the Middle East.
232 
It has also been argued by AIPAC that U.S. security assistance to Israel also provides many 
benefits for the U.S. AIPAC believe that “for decades, U.S. support for Israel through annual 
security aid has helped the U.S. achieve critical goals in the Middle East and created jobs for 
Americans, as Israel is required to spend 74% of U.S. aid in the U.S.”233 
Furthermore, AIPAC has argued that Israel provides U.S. the opportunity to test its 
weapons and military technologies in order to improve both its equipment and tactics. Example 
of this opportunity includes the involvement of the U.S. in the Iraq and Afghanistan war. Finally, 
AIPAC has argued that U.S. military support to Israel has decreased the chance of major regional 
war as Israel’s enemies cannot overcome Israel with military capability.234 
 In addition to economic and military assistance, the U.S. provides Israel with unflinching 
diplomatic support in the international community and organisations. A good example of this 
support is the number of resolutions against Israel that have been vetoed by the U.S (See Table 
3). As shown in Table 3, between 1972 and 2011, Washington vetoed 43 UNSC resolutions that 
condemned Israel.
235
 The last resolution vetoed by the U.S. was on September 19, 2011. This 
resolution demanded that “Israel, as the occupying power, immediately and completely ceases all 
settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory including East Jerusalem and that Israel 
fully respect its legal obligations in this regard.”236 All fourteen members of the Security Council 
voted for the resolution and it was only the U.S, one of the five permanent members of the 
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UNSC, who voted against it. Explaining why the U.S. vetoed this, the U.S.-UN Ambassador 
Susan E. Rice said the vote should not be misunderstood as support for settlement activity. “On 
the contrary, we reject in the strongest terms the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlement 
activity;” she declared, “Continued settlement activity violates Israel’s international 
commitments, devastates trust between the parties, and threatens the prospects for peace...”237  
Table 3: The resolutions vetoed by the U.S. administrations against Israel in the United Nations 
Security Council from 1972 to 2011  
                  President 
 
 
Nixon 
 
Ford 
 
Carter 
 
Reagan 
 
G.W. Bush 
 
Clinton 
 
G. Bush 
 
Obama 
 
Number of Vetoes 
 
2 
 
4 
 
1 
 
19 
 
4 
 
3 
 
9 
 
1 
Source: World Press
238
  
 As shown in Table 3, from a total of 43 resolutions vetoed by the U.S. in the UNSC, 5 
were applied by Democrat administrations during Carter, Clinton and Obama’s terms of office, 
with the other 38 vetoes being applied by Republican administrations.
239 
 
 In addition, there were also numerous resolutions focusing on Israel that never reached 
the voting stage in the UNSC, due to the threat of a veto. The U.S. has voted for UN resolutions 
on a few occasions, whenever the UN resolution focused on mild criticism or when the U.S. 
wanted to exert pressure on Israel.
240
 Outside the UNSC, the U.S. routinely backs Israel 
whenever the UN General Assembly passes one of its many resolutions condemning Israeli 
behaviour or calling for action on behalf of the Palestinians.
241 
Similarly, when Arab countries 
try to raise the issue of Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal within the IAEA, Washington steps in 
to prevent the organisation from placing the matter on its agenda.
242
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 Apart from U.S. military and financial aid and strong diplomatic support to Israel in the 
international community, the Israel lobby and pro-Israel groups are another crucial element in the 
U.S.-Israel relationship. The Israel lobby and pro-Israel groups have been influential in the U.S. 
policy-making process for many years.
243
 This influence is not unusual as the U.S. has the largest 
Jewish population in the world: about 2.5% to 3% of the American population (5 to 6 million), 
with strong positions in U.S. politics and society.
244 
In the American political scene, and mostly 
in American presidential elections, the Jewish population have a high turnout. This is especially 
important since most Jews inhabit key states like California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New 
York, and Pennsylvania, which determine who becomes President of the U.S.
245
 About 95% of 
Jews believe that the U.S. should offer Israel both diplomatic and military support.
246
 In addition, 
about 50% of Jews believe that the U.S. should help Israel even when U.S. has to go to war.
247
 
This clearly shows that the most committed U.S presidential candidate to Israel affairs is the 
most favorable candidate for these pro-Israel groups in America.
248
  
 In addition to the strong political participation of Jews, the financial support of American 
Israel lobbies during election campaigns has also increased the dependence of American 
politicians on Jewish voters.
249 
Jews are recognized for their generous donation and funding in 
American politics.
250 
American Jews are "among the major financiers of political parties”251 and 
the support of Israel is one of the important issues that both Republican and Democrat candidates 
acknowledge in U.S. presidential campaigns.
252 
 
 Studies of various U.S. administrations show the role of Israel lobbies in both Republican 
and Democrat governments. For example, it has been suggested that because the Clinton 
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administration had some leading pro – Israel supporters in the administration, that this may have 
influenced his policy in Middle East. Notably, among these individuals were “Martin Indyk, the 
former deputy director of research at AIPAC and cofounder of the pro-Israel Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, who served as a member of the National Security Council, as 
ambassador to Israel and as Assistant Secretary of State during the Clinton administration.”253 
Another pro-Israeli is Dennis Ross who was Clinton’s special delegate in the Middle East.254  
 AIPAC’s mission is to “insure close and consistently strong U.S. - Israel relations.”255 
Moreover, AIPAC administers many activities including frequent policy conferences in 
Washington, breakfast meetings with Jewish leaders and different workshops to analyse how to 
influence the media.
256 
Many important politicians including George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Dick 
Cheney, Hillary Clinton, John Edwards, John McCain, and Barack Obama have attended these 
conferences.
257 
For example, in May 2004, President George W. Bush attended an AIPAC policy 
conference and in the conference, Bush mentioned that “by defending the freedom, prosperity 
and security of Israel, you are also serving the cause of America. Our nation is stronger and safer 
because we have a true and dependable ally in Israel.”258  
 Apart from AIPAC, Christian evangelicals also influence U.S. relations with 
Israel.  Christian evangelicals are a powerful pro-Israel group in the U.S. who are also 
active members of AIPAC;
259 
they believe
 that Israel’s rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy 
and so support Israel’s expansionist agenda and believe that pressuring Israel is contrary 
to God’s will.260 According to Mearsheimer & Walt:…by providing financial support to 
the settler movement and by publicly inveighing against territorial concessions, the 
Christian Zionists have reinforced hard-line attitudes in Israel and the U.S. and have 
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made it more difficult for American leaders to put pressure on Israel. Absent their 
support, settlers would be less numerous in Israel, and the U.S. and Israeli governments 
would be less constrained by their presence in the occupied territories as well as their 
political activities. Plus, Christian tourism has become a lucrative source of income for 
Israel, reportedly generating revenues in the neighbourhood of $1 billion each year.”261 
However, some scholars including Alan Dershowitz argues that the role of the lobby in 
U.S. has been exaggerated by Mearsheimer and Walt .He believes that “this type of paranoid 
worldview, in which Jews manipulate and control the media and government, is not the sort of 
argument one would expect from prominent academics.”262 Also David Gergen in his article “An 
Unfair Attack” argues that Mearsheimer and Walt charges against Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk 
impugn their loyalty and services to America's national security. He also discusses that “it is 
wrong and unfair to call into question the loyalty of millions of American Jews who have 
faithfully supported Israel while also working tirelessly and generously to advance America's 
cause, both at home and abroad. They are among our finest citizens and should be praised, not 
pilloried.
263
 
Briefly, therefore, U.S. financial and military aid, as well as, its diplomatic support for 
Israel and the vital element of the Israel lobby, represent three important factors that shape U.S. 
and Israeli relations in the Middle-East and thus influence U.S policy regarding this region. 
4.4 Security  
 The problem of terrorism has been at the forefront of the U.S.–Iran relationship for many 
years.
 
Since 1984, the U.S. has considered Iran as a state that sponsors terrorism and recently, the 
U.S. Department of State declared Iran as “the most active state sponsor of terrorism.” 264   
Indeed, after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, because of the high level of tension between the U.S. 
and Iran, the U.S. repeatedly accused Iran of providing substantial amounts of weapons and 
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financial assistance to hostile organisations and groups like Hezbollah, which are against U.S. 
interests in the Middle-East.  
Hezbollah is a Shiite military, political and social organization in Lebanon which was 
formed in 1982 and which has strong ties with Iran. Over the years, Hezbollah has transformed 
itself from a militant group to being Lebanon’s prominent political and military force. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. still considers Hezbollah as a terrorist group and has accused them of 
masterminding several acts of anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli terrorism during the 1980s and 1990s. 
The biggest of these acts by Hezbollah was the bombing of the U.S. marine peacekeepers in 
Lebanon in October, 1983.
265
 The attack in Beirut killed 241 marines and forced President 
Ronald Reagan to withdraw all U.S. troops from Lebanon.
266 
 
 Since the formation of Hezbollah, the Iranian government has developed a cordial 
relationship with the group as the two share common religious and ideological believes.
267
 The 
support of Hezbollah has led Iran to be included in the list of states that support terrorism. The 
U.S. has accused Iran of providing significant intelligence information and military training to 
Hezbollah forces during the past few decades. In fact, it is true that Hezbollah has benefited from 
its close relationship with Iranian organizations like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and 
Iranian officials, including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, more than any other group or 
movement since the Islamic Revolution.
268 
 
 Because of the close relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, Iran’s nuclear program has 
given significant grounds for concern in the U.S, Israel and in many Western countries. Several 
scholars, including Kenneth Kezman, have argued that Iran’s close relationship with 
organizations such as Hezbollah would increase the possibility of nuclear proliferation to non-
state organisations in the event of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. This would threaten the 
security of all countries, not just the U.S. According to Kezman, “Iran has long seen Hezbollah 
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as an instrument to exert regional influence”.269 These close relationships, along with Iran’s 
desire to pursue a nuclear program, make Iran a potential threat as a supplier of such weapons to 
terrorist groups.
270 
In this case, Iran could use these groups as a possible nuclear threat to the 
U.S. and Israel.
271 
 
 Apart from the suspicion of a potential threat of nuclear proliferation on the part of Iran, 
there is also the possibility that the transfer of nuclear information or technology will take place 
without explicit state involvement.
272 
Scholars like Shahram Chubin have argued that “even if 
the Iranian government were committed to securing nuclear arms, some powerful internal 
organizations, such as the Revolutionary Guards, may contain unstable elements willing to 
transfer sensitive nuclear technology to terrorist groups”.273  It has been argued that the transfer 
of nuclear technology could be carried out by unhappy members of the government in time of 
crisis. Chubin, for instance, have argued that “without severe supervision the probability of 
transfers would be higher.”274 Therefore, preventing nuclear proliferation to states like Iran 
becomes a means of preventing nuclear transfer to terrorists groups.
275
 As President Bush 
asserted in a 2005 speech at the National Endowment for Democracy, “We are determined to 
deny weapons of mass destruction to outlaw regimes and their terrorist allies who would use 
them without hesitation.”276  
 An Iran with nuclear arms also has an influence on the balance of power in the Middle 
East. Iranian neighbours, especially the Persian Gulf States, consider Iran’s nuclear program as a 
threat to their own security and stability.
277
 Many scholars have argued that “an Iran with nuclear 
arms is more of an immediate threat to the region and its neighbours than any other state or area. 
In fact, Iran’s neighbours will have to adjust to living alongside Iran’s nuclear capability and 
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missiles. These military capabilities will aggravate already existing geopolitical disparities, 
Iran’s demographic and geographical weight, and the possible political ascendance of Shi’a in 
the Gulf region”.278 
 A copy of a leaked cable on April 20, 2008, published in the New York Times after being 
released by the whistleblower, WikiLeaks, clearly shows the concern of Arab states, especially 
Saudi Arabia, over Iran’s nuclear activities.279 The cable detailed a meeting between General 
David Petraeus, the top U.S. military commander in the Middle East, U.S. ambassador to Iraq, 
Ryan Crocker, King Abdullah, and other Saudi Princes. At the meeting, the Saudi ambassador to 
the U.S., Adel al-Jubeir "Recalled the Saudi King's frequent exhortations to the U.S. to attack 
Iran and by so doing put an end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program." The cable also made it clear 
that the Saudi ambassador asked Americans “to cut off the head of the snake,”280 the “snake” 
being a reference to Iran. A Saudi newspaper also observed in 2003 that nobody believed Iran 
sought nuclear weapons to use against Israel or the U.S, as “the real target is the neighbouring 
countries.”281 
 Apart from Saudi Arabia, other Persian Gulf States are also worried that a nuclear Iran 
will become more aggressive against them.
282
 This concern is informed by Iran’s history in the 
region. In fact, Iran’s ambition for regional dominance started during the Shah’s reign. Iran’s 
support for Shi’a groups in the 1980s and in the early 1990s, and the Iranian government’s 
attempt to export the Islamic Revolution to the western shores of the Persian Gulf are still fresh 
in the memory of most Arab states.
283 
 
 For these reasons, it does seem more likely that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons 
might encourage other states in the region to improve their military and defensive position. The 
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nuclear arms race is most likely to be a reaction to the emergence of a new nuclear power in the 
region.
284
 
 In fact, when Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuge program was disclosed in 2003, 
most countries in the Middle East and Persian Gulf decided to invest in nuclear power plants. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) under Saudi Arabian leadership arranged a team to study 
the peaceful purposes of nuclear power.
285
 Saudi Arabia announced plans to build 16 nuclear 
reactors as a 20 year perspective and in June, 2011, they signed a nuclear cooperation agreement 
with Argentina to develop the use of atomic technology in the industry.
286 
The UAE also began 
cooperating with the IAEA in order to receive assistance to set up nuclear energy operations and 
to publish a comprehensive nuclear policy paper entitled ”Policy of the United Arab Emirates on 
the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy” that analyses the energy 
needs of the country over the next several decades.
287
 
 To summarise, an Iran with nuclear arms would change the balance of power in the 
Middle East and the Persian Gulf and encourage other states in the region to improve their 
military bases with a nuclear approach. Indeed, the rise of nuclear power would subsequently 
trigger instability and more conflict to undermine U.S. national interests in the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 Iran’s nuclear program began in 1953. After Operation Ajax, a coup that overthrew the 
government of Mohammad Mosaddegh for nationalizing oil fields and refineries previously 
managed by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the new government under the Shah, with strong 
support from the U.S., initiated the Iranian nuclear program. It must be emphasized, however, 
that this nuclear program was for peaceful purposes only.  The analysis has shown that it was the 
U.S., under President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” mission, which established the 
foundations of Iran’s nuclear program. In addition to Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” incentive, 
the U.S. Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) in 1954 to strengthen its support for 
nuclear agreements with its allies, such as the Shah of Iran.  
 A historical analysis of the development of Iran’s nuclear program demonstrates that the 
support given to the Shah by the U.S. for his nuclear program initiative had a highly significant 
impact on Iran’s nuclear development. Indeed, the Shah benefited from his special relationship 
with the U.S. when developing his program. Historical analysis also indicates that the U.S. 
position towards Iran’s nuclear program changed after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. 
Not only was this change motivated by the hostile stance of Tehran towards the administration, 
but more importantly by the fact that the U.S. and its allies became convinced that Iran was 
developing nuclear weapons program. 
 What made this situation even more critical for the U.S. was also the fact that the new 
Islamic regime also adopted a very hostile stance towards the U.S. These were evident from the 
very start when it by suspended all contracts the Shah held with them including all agreements 
and contracts related to Iran’s nuclear program. There were indications that Iran’s internal and 
international problems during the first couple years following the Islamic Revolution, including 
the Iran-Iraq war, interrupted Iran’s nuclear activities.  However,  Iraq’s resort to chemical attack 
on Iran during the eight year Iraq-Iran war and the silence of the international community over  
this use of chemical weapons, combined with the support given to Iraq by the U.S. at that time, 
encouraged Iran to renew its nuclear facilities and begin its nuclear activities. Critically, 
however, was the fact that the nuclear program now included a weapons component.  
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 In Chapter 4, it was shown that in 2003, the revelation of Iran’s uranium enrichment 
facilities in Natanz and Arak increased U.S. concerns. Presidents Bush and Obama then began to 
toughen pressures on Iran to stop enriching its nuclear facilities.  Bush addressed Iran as an 
“Axis of Evil” and the IAEA, with strong support from the U.S., referred Iran to the UNSC. 
From 2006 to 2011, seven UN resolutions were passed by the UNSC against Iran’s nuclear 
project and Obama adopted the same hostile policies as Bush, including sanctions, UNSC 
resolutions and economic pressures to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear program.  
 In the light of the above, the analysis has shown that U.S. national interests in the Middle 
East are the main reasons why the U.S. has been hostile to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. This 
interpretation confirms with the realist perspective which interprets state actions in terms of their 
national interests. While the U.S. has a variety of interests in the Middle East, the main three, oil, 
Israel and U.S. security interests in the Middle East have been analysed in this study. Also, 
following thesis has argued that the importance of realism to foreign policy and that material 
interest are still important. In this case, oil, Israel, and security have been important long term 
goals for the U.S., and it has been shown that when the U.S.  Cooperate with Iran, it is for 
defence of these, and when it is hostile to Iran, it is also for defence of these interests.   
 It was found that the Middle East, and specifically the Persian Gulf oil reserves, plays an 
important role in the U.S. economy. The free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and the Straits 
of Hormuz, the most strategically significant transit chokepoint in the world, comprise the most 
important U.S. national interests in the Middle East. This means the U.S will do anything to avert 
any political unrest and crisis in that region; as such crises could generate a huge oil price hike 
and subsequent economic problems in countries like the U.S. It is also a concern of the U.S. that 
nuclear Iran would use the leverage of nuclear capability to disrupt the flow of oil through the 
Straits of Hormuz in order to achieve Iran’s political and economic interests. For instance, it 
would be possible for Iran to threaten to use its nuclear weapon to close the Straits.    
 Furthermore, the security of Israel is also of interest to the U.S. The U.S.–Israel 
relationship, which began with the creation of the State of Israel, have been based on a number 
of factors, including U.S. foreign assistance in the form of financial, military and diplomatic 
support to Israel via international communities and organizations, as well as the strong and active 
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Israeli communities and lobbies in the U.S. Since Iran’s nuclear program is an immediate threat 
to Israel, the U.S. would like to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear activities. 
 Finally, as the U.S. considers Iran as a state which sponsors terrorism, the fear of the 
transfer of nuclear weapons from Iran to terrorist groups represents grounds for concern. In 
addition, this analysis shows that nuclear Iran would change the balance of power in the Middle 
East, impose threats on Iran’s neighbours and encourage an arms race between countries in the 
Middle East. This would result in instability and insecurity in the region. In fact, it could 
ultimately be stated that any power change and instability in the Middle East would be a threat to 
the U.S. and have an influence on U.S national interests there. 
 57 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Addis, Casey. L. “Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, 
(February 14, 2011):26-27.  
 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33476.pdf (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Adler, Emanuel. “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in world politics.” European   
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, (1997). 
http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/3/3/319.full.pdf+html (Accessed September 19, 2012). 
Akbarzadeh, Shahram. “Obama and the U.S. Policy Change on Iran.” Global Change, Peace and  
Security, 21, No. 3 (2009).  
Ansari, Ali .M. Confronting Iran. New York: Basic Books, 2006. 
Ashley, Sean P.  “The Iranian Nuclear Program: Realist vs. Constructivist Models,” E- 
International Relations, (August 18, 2012). 
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/18/the-iranian-nuclear-program-realist-vs-constructivist-
models/ (Accessed September 05, 2012). 
Badi, Awadh. A. “Nuclear Energy in the Gulf Cooperation Council States,” Security Index, 18,  
No 1, (year) . 
Bahgat, Gawdat. “Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran.” Iranian Studies, 39, No.  
3 (2006). 
Bahgat, Gawdat. “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Iran and Israel.” Contemporary 
Security Policy, 26, No. 1 (2005). 
Bill, James. A. The Eagle and the Lion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. 
Booth, Ken. “Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice,”  International  
Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3(Jul., 1991). 
Bowen, Wyn.Q. and Brewer, Jonathan. “Iran’s Nuclear Challenge: Nine Years and Counting.” 
International Affairs, 87, No 4 (2011). 
British Broadcasting Cooperation. Bush Offers to Help EU Over Iran, March 04, 2008. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4317579.stm (Accessed November 08, 2011).  
British Broadcasting Cooperation. U.S. Warns Iran Over Threat To Block Oil Route, December  
 28, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16348633 (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
 58 
 
British Broadcasting Cooperation. Iranian leader denies Holocaust, December 14, 2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4527142.stm  (Accessed January 03, 2012).  
Brito, Dagobert And Jaffe, Amy. M. “Reducing Vulnerability Of The Strait Of Hormuz,” in 
Getting Ready For A Nuclear Ready Iran. Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War Co, 
2005. 
Brown, L. Carl. “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,”Foreign Affairs,  
(September/October 2006). 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61871/l-carl-brown/the-israel-lobby-and-us-
foreign-policy (Accessed September 10, 2012). 
Byman, Daniel. “Iran, Terrorism, And Weapons Of Mass Destruction,” Studies In Conflict & 
Terrorism, 31, (2008). 
 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2008/03_iran_byman/03_iran_byman
.pdf (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Cable News Network, U.S. Slaps New Sanctions on Iran, October 25, 2007. 
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-10-25/politics/iran.sanctions_1_bank-melli-bank-saderat-
 bank-mellat?_s=PM:POLITICS  (Accessed June 19, 2011). 
Cohen, Warren. I and Tucker, Nancy. B. Lyndon Johnson Confronts The World: American 
Foreign Policy, 1963-1968. Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Colvin, Ross. “Cut Off Head Off Snake “Saudis Told U.S. On Iran,” Reuters News Agency, 
 November 29, 2010.  
 http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/29/us-wikileaks-iran-
saudisidUSTRE6AS02B20101129 (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Chubin, Shahram. Iran’s Nuclear Program. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2006. 
Cordesman, Anthony H., and  Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, “Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Uncertain 
 Nature of Iran’s Nuclear Programs,”  (April 2006):21. 
  http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060412_iran_uncertainty.pdf (Accessed May 22, 
 2012) 
Dassa Kaye, D. And Wehery, Frederic. M. “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions Of Neighbours, 
Survival, 49, No. 2 (2007): 118. 
 59 
 
 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396330701437777  (Accessed January 
03,     2012). 
Dawason, Julian. “ A Constructivist Approach to the US-Iranian Nuclear Problem,” (M.A.  
Thesis, University of Calgary, 2011). 
http://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/48728/1/2011_Dawson_MSS.pdf (Accessed 
September 05, 2012). 
Dershowitz, Alan. “Debunking the newest and oldest Jewish Conspiracy: A reply to the Mearsheimer – 
Walt working paper,” Harvard Law School, April 2006 
Dietrich, John .W. Foreign Policy Reader. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005. 
Donnelly, Jack. Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
2000. 
Dorraj, Manochehr. “Behind Iran’s Nuclear Pursuit?” Peace Review, (2006). 
Dumbrell, John. “The Bush Administration, U.S. Public Diplomacy and Iran.” Working Paper, 
Durham University, (2007). 
Duffield, John. S. “Oil And The Iraq War: How The United States Could Have Expected To 
Benefit, And Might Still.” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 
(June 2005). 
Duffield, John. S. Over A Barrel: The Cost Of U.S. Foreign Oil Dependence. Stanford: Stanford 
Law And Politics, 2008. 
“Europe’s Iran Diplomacy.” The European Center of Excellence of the University of North 
Carolina, (2008). 
 http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/business_media/mediabriefs/Brief7-0803-iran.pdf 
(Accessed November 08, 2011). 
Federation of American Scientists.  
 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Fitzpatrick, Mark. “Assessing Iran’s Nuclear programme,” Survival, 48, No. 3 (2006). 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396330600905494 (Accessed January 
03,   2012). 
Freedman, Lawrence. A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts The Middle East. New York: 
Public Affairs, 2008. 
 60 
 
Freedman, Robert. O. “American Policy Toward Iraq and Iran  in Clinton’s Second Term.” 
Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 1999. 
 http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/jcpa/frr01.html (Accessed November 08, 2011). 
Gasiorowski, Mark. J. U.S. Foreign Policy And The Shah. Itacha:  Cornell University Press, 
1991. 
Gendzier, Irene. “Oil, Iraq and U.S. Foreign Policy In The Middle East.” Situation Analysis, 
Issue 2, Spring 2003. 
 http://manghani.free.fr/sa/issue2/gendzier.pdf (Accessed December 22, 2011). 
Greg, David. “An Unfair Attach,” U.S. News and World Report, 23 June 2006,  
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/opinion/articles/060403/3edit.htm (Accessed September 
04, 2012). 
Guzansky, Yoel. “The Arab Gulf States And The Iranian Nuclear Challenge: In The Line Of 
Fire,” Comprehensive Tabloid Weekly, February 09, 2011. 
 http://www.weeklyblitz.net/1272/the-arab-gulf-states-and-the-iranian-nuclear (Accessed 
January 03, 2012). 
Guzinni, Stefano. “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations.” European  
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, (2000): 174. 
http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~courses/PoliticalScience/661B1/documents/GuzziniReconstr
uctionofConstructivisminIR.pdf (Accessed September 19, 2012). 
Hadian, Nasser. “Iran's Nuclear Program: Background and Clarification.” Contemporary 
Security Policy, 29, No. 3 (2008). 
Harrop, William. S. Obama’s Iran Policy: Mutual Respect Matters.” Iranian Review of Foreign 
Affairs, 1, No. 3 (2010) 
Hassani, Mohammad. and Dabbaghi, Afsaneh. “Iran's Oil Revenues Fluctuations: Analysis of 
External and Internal Factors (1970-2007),” 
 http://www.business.curtin.edu.au/files/Hassani_oil_Revenues_.pdf(Accessed November 
07, 2011). 
Hurd, Ian. “Constructivism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian 
Resus-Semi and Duncan Snidal, (Oxford: Oxfor University Press: 2008). 
http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~ihu355/Home_files/17-Smit-Snidal-c17.pdf  
(Accessed September 19, 2012). 
 61 
 
International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/index.html (Accessed 
December 02, 2011). 
International Crisis Group. 
“
Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program.” Middle East Report, 27 
October 2003. 
Islam, Thowhidul. “The Logic Behind Iran's Uncompromising Nuclear Policy,” Asia Journal of 
Global Studies, 4, NO.2 (2010-11). 
Jervis, Robert.” Realism in the Study of World Politics,” International Organization, Volume  
52, Issue 04, (September 1998). 
Johns, Andrew. L. “The Johnson Administration, the Shah of Iran, and the Changing Pattern of 
U.S.-Iranian Relations, 1965–1967,” Journal of Cold War Studies,9, No. 2 (2007). 
John, Anthony. W. “Nuclear Negotiations: Iran, The EU (And The U.S.).” American University, 
School of International Service. 
  http://www.aupeace.org/files/Wanis_IranEUandUS2007S.pdf (Accessed November 08, 
2011).  
Katzman, Kenneth. “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses.” Congressional Research 
Service, (April 18, 2011). 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf (Accessed November 09, 2011). 
 
Keddie, Nikki. R. and Gasiorowski, Mark. Neither East Nor West: Iran, The Soviet Union, and 
the United States. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. 
Keddie, Nikki. R.. Modern Iran, Roots and Result of Revolution, New Haven & London, 2006. 
Kemp, Geoffrey. U.S. And Iran, The Nuclear Dilemma: Next Steps. Washington: The Nixon 
Centre, 2004. 
Kibaroglu, Mustafa. "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for 
Nuclear Power," Middle East Journal, 60,  (2006). 
Kibaroglu, Mustafa. “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of 
the West,” Middle Eastern Studies, 43, No. 2 (2007). 
Kingseed, Cole. C. Eisenhower and the Suez crisis of 1956. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1995. 
King, John. A. and Vile. John. R. Presidents From Eisenhower Through Johnson. Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1953-1969. 
 62 
 
Koch, Andrew. and Jeanette, Wolf. “Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: a Profile,” Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, 1998. 
Labys, Walter. C. “Globalization, Oil Price Volatility, And The U.S. Economy,” Natural 
Resource Economics Program. (2006). 
http://www.rri.wvu.edu/pdffiles/oilprice.pdf (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Lang, Jamie. “International Sanctions: The Pressure On Iran To Abandon Nuclear Proliferation.” 
The Journal of International Business and Law, 141 (2007). 
Lieber, Robert. J. “The US‐Israeli relationship after 50 years,” Israel Affairs,5, No.1 (1998). 
Maloney, Suzanne. “U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Missed Opportunities and Paths Forward.” The 
Fletcher Forum of World Affair, 32, No. 2 (2008). 
Maloney, Suzanne. “Sanctioning Iran: If Only It Were So Simple.” The Washington Quarterly, 3 
(2010). 
http://www.twq.com/10january/docs/10jan_Maloney.pdf (Accessed November 09, 2011). 
Mann, Jim. “Iran’s Nuclear Plans Worry U.S. Officials.” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 1991. 
 
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-27/news/mn-395_1_nuclear-weapons-programs 
(Accessed November 08, 2011). 
McKay, Sandra. The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation (New York: Dutton 1996). 
Mearsheimer, John. J. And Walt, Stephen. M. The Israel Lobby And U.S. Foreign Policy. New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007. 
Mearsheimer, John.J. And Walt, Stephen. M. “The Israel Lobby And U.S. Foreign Policy,” 
London Review Of Books, 28, No. 6 (2006). 
Migdalovitz, Carol. “Israel: Background And Relations With The United States,” Congressional 
Research Service, (February 26, 2008). 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110751.pdf (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Millani, Abbas. The Shah. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
Miller, Elissa. “The Strategic U.S. – Israel Relationship,” The Tufts Daily, February 17, 2011.  
 http://www.tuftsdaily.com/the-strategic-us-israel-relationship-1.2472499#.TwQSbzVPt11 
 (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran.  “Basic Facts About Iran’s Peaceful   
Nuclear Activities.” 2012. (Statement on the website of the  Embassy of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Oslo).  http://iranembassy.no/en/6.htm  Accessed July 28, 2012 
 63 
 
Mousavi, Mohammad Ali. and Norouzi, Yasser. “Iran-U.S. Nuclear Standoff: A Game Theory 
Approach.” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, 1, No. 1 (2010). 
Mousavi Shafaee, Msoud. “A constructive view into the enmity between Iran and the west:   
Manifestation of the Islamic Revolution Identity in Iranian foreign policy behavior,”  
Geopolitics Quarterly, Volume: 6, No 4, (2010). 
http://www.sid.ir/en/VEWSSID/J_pdf/108020112011.pdf    (Accessed September 19, 
2012). 
Mraz, Jerry. L. “The Policy of Dual Containment in Dual Containment: U.S. Policy in the 
Persian Gulf and A Recommendation for the Future,” 1997. 
Murray, Donette. “The Carcass Of Dead Policies: Lessons for Obama in Dealing with Iran,” 
Contemporary Politics, 16, No. 2 (2010). 
Nash, Philip. “Nuclear Weapons In Kennedy’s Foreign Policy,” The Historian,56, (1994).   
Nikou, Semira. N. “Timeline of Iran’s Nuclear Activities,” United States Institute of Peace, 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-irans-nuclear-activities (Accessed November 
08,2011) 
Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Nuclear Overview.” Iran Country Profile 
 http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/index.html  (Accessed November 08, 
2011). 
Ogultarhan, Adem. “Iran’s Nuclear Program: The U.S. Misses Opportunities?” Alternatives: 
Turkish Journal of International Relations, 9, No. 1 (2010). 
Ozcan, Nihat. A. and 
 Ozdamar, Ozgur. “Iran’s Nuclear Program And The Future Of U.S.- 
Iranian Relations.” Middle East Policy, XVI, No. 1 (2009).  
Partow, Negar. “The Oil Market: Players, Challenges, And Opportunities”. Policy Quarterly.  7, 
Issue 3 (2008). 
http://ips.ac.nz/publications/files/88e4bb751ee.pdf (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Perthes, Volker. “Ambition And Fear: Iran’s Foreign Policy and Nuclear Programme.” Survival, 
52, No. 3 (2010). 
Peterson, Scott. “For Iran, Wikileaks Cables Validate Its Scepticism of Obama’s Sincerity.” The 
Christian Science Monitor, November 30, 2010. 
  http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1130/For-Iran-WikiLeaks-cables-
validate-its-skepticism-of-Obama-s-sincerity (Accessed November 09, 2011). 
 64 
 
Pham, Peter. J. “Iran’s Threat To The Strait Of Hormuz: A Realist Assessment,” American 
Foreign Policy Interests, 32, (2010). 
 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10803921003697542 (Accessed January 
03, 2012). 
Pham ,Peter. J. “What is in the National Interest? Hans Morgenthau’s Realist Vision and  
American Foreign Policy,” American Foreign Policy Interets, 30, (2008).  
http://www.jmu.edu/nelsoninstitute/National%20Interest.pdf 
Pollak, Kenneth. M. The Persian Puzzle. New York: Random House, 2004. 
Pollock, David. “A Year Of Transition: U.S. Policy In The Middle East And Mediterranean, 
2008.” European Institute of The Mediterranean, (2009). 
http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2009/aarticles/a35.pdf (Accessed November 08, 2011). 
Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, “World without Zionism,” October 26, 2005. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060625220249/http://www.president.ir/farsi/ahmadinejad/ 
speeches/1384/aban-84/840804sahyonizm.htm (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Quillen, Chris. “Iranian Nuclear Weapons Policy:  Past, Present, And Possible Future.” Middle 
East Review of International Affairs, 6, No. 2 (2002). 
Ramazani, Rouhollah. K. The United States and Iran. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1982. 
Rajaee, Bahram. “Deciphering Iran: The Political Evolution of The Islamic Republic and U.S. 
Foreign Policy After September 11.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and The 
Middle East, 24, 1 (2004). 
Reuters. “Talking with the Axis of Evil.” July 17, 2008. 
 http://blogs.reuters.com/global/2008/07/17/talking-with-the-axis-of-evil/ (Accessed June 
 23, 2011).  
Reich, Bernard and and Stephen H. Gotowicki, “The United States And The Persian Gulf In The 
Bush Administration,” Brassey’s Defense Yearbook. London: Royal United Services 
Institute, 1991.  
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/usgulf.htm (Accessed May 29, 2012) 
Rubin, Barry. Paved With Good Intentions. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. 
Rudeneh, Odeh. “The Jewish Factors In U.S. Politics,” Journal Of Palestine Studies, 1, No. 4 
(1972). 
 65 
 
 http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2535665.pdf?acceptTC=true (Accessed January 03, 
2012). 
Russel, Richard. L. “Off and Running: The Middle East Nuclear Arms Race,” Joint Force 
Quarterly, Issue 58 (2010).  
 http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA53
6884 (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Samhat, Nayef. H. “Middle Powers and American Foreign Policy: Lessons from Iran-US. 
Relations, 1962-77,” Policy Studie Journal, 28, NO. 1(2000). 
Sahimi, Mohammad. “Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part I: Its History.” Payvand’s Iran News. 
December 22, 2004.  
 http://www.payvand.com/news/04/dec/1186.html (Accessed November 08, 2011). 
Sahimi, Mohammad. “Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part V.” Payvand’s Iran News. December 22, 
2004. 
  http://www.payvand.com/news/04/dec/1186.html (Accessed November 08, 2011). 
Samore, Gary. and Einhorn, Robert.J. “Ending Russian Assistance to Iran’s Nuclear Bomb.” 
Survival, 44, No. 2 (2002). 
Sauer, Tom. “Coercive Diplomacy By The EU. Case Study: The Iranian Nuclear Weapons 
Crisis.” 2006.  
 http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-istanbul/virtualpaperroom/022.pdf (Accessed November 08, 
2011). 
Sens, Allen and Stoett, Peter. Global Politic: Origins, Currents, Directions, Ontario: Nelson 
College Indigenous 4th edition, 2002. 
Sharp, Jeremy. M. “U.S. Foreign Aid To Israel,” Congressional Research Service, (September 
16, 2010). 
 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Shatz, Adam. “In Search Of Hezbollah,” The New York Review Of The Books, April 29, 2004. 
 http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/apr/29/in-search-of-hezbollah/?page=2 
(Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Schmitz, David. F. The United States and Right Wing Dictatorships. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
Shafaee, Masoud Mousavi “A Constructivist View into the Enmity between Iran & the West:        
 66 
 
Manifestation of the Islamic Revolution Identity in Iranian Foreign Policy Behavior,”  
Geopolitics Quarterly, Volume: 6, No 4, (Winter 2010). 
Slavin, Barbara. Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to 
Confrontation. New York: St. Martin Press, 2007. 
Sokolsky, Richard. D. The United States And The Persian Gulf: Reshaping Security Strategy For 
The Post Cotainment Era. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2004. 
Sokolski, Henry And Clawson, Patrick. Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2004. 
 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub368.pdf (Accessed January 03, 
2012). 
Soltani, Fakhreddin. “Foreign Policy of Iran After Islamic Revolution,” Journal of Politics and 
Law, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2010). 
Summitt, April. R. “For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran,” Middle 
East Journal,58, No. 4 (2004). 
Takeyh, Ray. Hidden Iran: Paradox And Power In The Islamic Republic, Times Books, 2007. 
Tarock, Adam. “Iran’s Nuclear Programme and the West,” Third World Quarterly, 27, No. 4 
(2006). 
Terry, Janice. U.S. Foreign Policy In The Middle East: The Role Of Lobbies And Special Interest 
Groups. London: Pluto Press, 2005. 
The Manchester Guardian, Israel seizes ship carrying weapons for Hezbollah, November 04, 
2009.  
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/04/israel-seizes-ship-weapons-hezbollah 
(Accessed February 05, 2012). 
“The United States National Security Strategy,” May 2010. 
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf 
(Accessed January 03, 2012). 
The Manchester Guardian, Oil Prices Soar As Iran Warns U.S. Aircraft Carrier Away From 
Persian Gulf, January 03, 2012.  
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/03/oil-prices-up-iran-america-tensions 
(Accessed January 03, 2012). 
 67 
 
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, “Meeting U.S. Commitment to Israel’s Security 
Is Essential”. (March 09, 2011). 
 http://www.aipac.org/~/media/Publications/Policy%20and%20Politics/AIPAC%20Analy
ses/Issue%20Memos/2011/03/AIPAC_Memo_Meeting_US_Commitment_to_Israels_Se
curity_Is_Essential.pdf (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
The Role of Israeli Lobby in U.S. Presidential Elections, May 09, 2009.  
http://www.buckbuckley.com/the-role-of-israeli-lobby-in-us-presidential-elections/ 
(Accessed January 03, 2012). 
“The United States National Security Strategy,” May 2010. 
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf 
(Accessed January 03, 2012). 
Torbat, Akbar. E. “A Gance At U.S. Politics Toward Iran: Past And Present.” Journal of Iranian 
Research and Analysis, 20, No. 1 (2004). 
Torbat, Akbar. E. “Impact of the U.S. Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran.” The World 
Economy, 28, No. 3 (2005). 
Toft, Peter. “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power.” Journal  
of International Relations and Development, Vol.8, No.4, (2005). 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
 http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_a.htm 
(Accessed February 04, 2012).   
U.S. Vetoes of UN Resolutions Critical Of Israel: 1972 – Present, September 22, 2011. 
 http://elpidiovaldes.wordpress.com/2011/09/22/u-s-vetoes-of-un-resolutions-critical-of-
israel-1972-present/ (Accessed January 03, 2012). 
United Nations News Centre, “United States Vetoes Security Council Resolution On Israeli 
Settlements,” February 18, 2011. 
            http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37572&Cr=palestin&Cr1=  (Accessed 
January 03, 2012). 
Walt, Stephen M.  “International Relations: one world, many theories,” Foreign Policy, No. 110,  
(Spring, 1998).  
http://ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/pol160A/Walt.1998.pdf  (Accessed September 05, 2012). 
Weldes, Jutta. “Constructing national interest,” European journal of international relations, Vol.  
 68 
 
2, (1996). 
http://ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/Pol272/Weldes.pdf  (Accessed September 19, 2012). 
Wohlforth, William C.  Realism and foreign policy in Foreign policy: theories, actors and cases. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
White House. John F. Kennedy. 
  http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/johnfkennedy  (Accessed November 07, 
2011). 
Zedalis, Rex. J. “The Total S.A. Case: Meaning Of “Investment” Under The ILSA.” The 
American Journal Of International Law, 92, No. 3 (1998). 
Zunes, Stephen. “The Strategic Functions Of U.S. Aid To Israel,” Middle East Policy, 4, Issue 4 
(1996). 
